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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Problem Statement 
‘Good heavens; give politicians the chance to legislate retrospectively and we will open 
a Pandora’s Box. I find that quite frightening. On this occasion a Pandora’s Box is 
opened in the excuse of catching the filthy people who cheat on tax. It is done for a noble 
purpose, one might say, and I agree. But I have never been one to subscribe to the view 
that the end justifies the means. That sort of proposition leads one down a track which is 
fraught with disaster. That is the track that every tyrant in history has gone down; that is, 
to make illegal today something which was legal last year.’1 
It is often argued that the crux of the problem surrounding the practice of retrospectively 
introducing tax legislation and the reason for it being a topic that will always stimulate 
heated debate is the apparent conflict of interests between taxpayers and the government.2 
On the one hand, it is argued by government that it has a duty to raise funds and to protect 
the fiscus from suffering undue harm. Thus, the ability to retrospectively introduce tax 
legislation is often justified as being a powerful and necessary tool with which to achieve 
this dual purpose.On the other hand however, all tax legislation must still be subject to both 
the constitutional rights of taxpayers as well as additional policy considerations.  
In light of these competing interests, the aim of this dissertation will be to critically analyse 
the practice of retrospectively introducing tax legislation from both a legal and a policy 
perspective. In the course of this analysis, particular attention will be paid to determining 
whether a specific form of retrospective tax legislation, namely legislation by press release, 
adequately resolves the legal and policy issues commonly relied upon to argue against the 
retrospective introduction of tax legislation.  
Whilst the practice of legislation by press release is by no means new in the South African 
tax sphere, there is a concern3 that this practice is at risk of being abused in light of the 
judgment inPienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue 
                                                          
1 R Loiacono& C Mortimer ‘Retrospective tax law: Has Pandora’s Box opened never to be shut again?’ (2017) 
15(1) eJournal of Tax Research 105-106. 
2C L Porter ‘Retroactivity of Tax Legislation’ (1975) 29 Tax Law 21. 
3 I Lamprecht ‘Concern about introduction of tax legislation “by press release”’ Moneyweb 30 August 2017 at 2. 
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Service and Another.4Pienaar Brothersrepresented the first time that legislation by press 
release was challenged on constitutional grounds. It was ultimately held by the court that 
there are no constitutional provisions which prohibit the retrospective introduction of tax 
legislation, nor which require that taxpayers be given advanced notice of such impending 
legislation.  
From a legal perspective it is submitted that the three potential provisions of the 1996 
Constitution5 which taxpayers could rely on to argue against retrospective tax legislation 
are: 
 the Rule of Law; 
 the prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of property as contained in section 
25(1) of the 1996 Constitution; and 
 the principle of Separation of Powers (with specific reference to the practice of 
legislation by press release).  
In this dissertation I will aim to challenge the above three legal arguments in order to 
determine whether they have any validity. I will further analyse the manner in which these 
three arguments were raised (or not raised) inPienaar Brothers. 
In evaluating and improving a tax system it is insufficient to simply focus on the legal 
aspects relating to such system. Rather, an objective approach needs to be adopted that will 
enable policy-makers to evaluate and improve the tax system and to develop policy that 
will be broadly perceived to be fair by those being subject to the system in question.6 The 
need for such an objective approach has given rise to an entire field of study being dedicated 
to the development of good tax policy design. Whilst it is unfortunately beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to focus in-depth on the development of good tax policy design, the 
practice of retrospectively introducing tax legislation as well that of legislation by press 
release will be challenged against three of the commonly cited principles of good tax 
policy: 
 the Principle of Certainty; 
                                                          
4Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another 2017 (6) SA 435 
GP.  
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.  
6 United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee: Principles of Tax Policy (2011) 3. 
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 the Principle of Tax Neutrality; and  
 the Principle of Economic Growth and Efficiency. 
The practice of retrospectively introducing tax legislation as well as that of legislation by 
press release will be critically analysed in light of the above three principles in order to 
determine whether a system which relies on such taxes can be deemed to be an objectively 
good tax system.  
It will be argued that whilst it is understandable why retrospective tax legislation evokes 
such strong emotional responses from those who argue against them, there are certain 
situations wherein they are necessary. From a legal perspective, the court inPienaar 
Brothers was correct in stating that the question of whether or not retrospective tax 
legislation falls foul of the 1996 Constitution is a question to be determined on the facts of 
the particular case in question. Once this approach is adopted, it is unlikely that there will 
be a rise in the reliance of such legislation, as it must still meet the high standards set by 
the 1996 Constitution.  
It will further be argued that although the court inPienaar Brothers missed a golden 
opportunity to deal with retrospective tax legislation in the context of the principles of good 
tax policy design, these principles are still of relevance to any discussion regarding such 
legislation. It will be argued that when used in the appropriate manner and circumstances, 
retrospective tax legislation, and more particularly legislation by press release, can meet 
the standards set by the principles of good tax policy design and can therefore form part of 
a good tax system.  
1.2 Rational for the Study 
Due to the wide condemnation of retrospective tax legislation, and in light of thePienaar 
Brothers judgement, it is crucial that the practice of introducing retrospective tax 
legislation, and that of legislation by press release, be critically analysed against the 
relevant constitutional provisions as well as the principles of good tax policy design.  
Through such analysis it will be possible to identify the circumstances in which such tax 
policy can form part of a good tax system. It will also be possible to identify the manner 
and circumstances in which such taxes should be implemented, so as to ensure that 
taxpayers being subjected thereto can change their perceptions thereof. This change of 
perception will, in turn, have a positive influence on tax compliance. 
10 
 
1.3 Research Question and Sub-Questions 
The following central research question will guide this study’s data collection and analysis: 
 What considerations should guide the Legislature when making the decision of whether 
or not to retrospectively introduce tax legislation in South Africa? 
The following subsidiary questions will be used to address various critical issues related to 
the retrospective introduction of tax legislation: 
 In what ways does South African Legislation limit the Legislature’s power to 
retrospectively introduce tax legislation? 
 Does the practice of retrospectively introducing tax legislation violate the guiding 
principles of good tax policy design? 
 Does the practice of legislation by press release adequately resolve the issues 
commonly associated with the retrospective introduction of tax legislation? 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
A desktop research methodology is this study’s primary research approach. The reason that 
this approach is preferred is that through a comprehensive literature review that has been 
incorporated into each individual chapter, this study will aim to find, interpret, apply and 
critique the law and policy principles relating to retrospective legislation in South Africa. 
It is submitted that there will also be an element of interdisciplinary research undertaken, 
in terms of which non-legal data will be combined with legal data. This approach is 
necessary because there are important economic and social-behavioural considerations that 
must be taken into account when deciding whether or not to introduce retrospective tax 
legislation. 
The data has been collected primarily through studying black letter law, the primary sources 
of which are the 1996 Constitution and international academic books and articles, online 
resources as well as foreign commission reports. 
The practice of retrospectively introducing tax legislation will be analysed against the 
standards set by the 1996 Constitution as well as the identified guiding principles of good 
tax policy in order to determine whether there are any situations in which such legislation 
11 
 
is permissible. An in-depth analysis of the judgment inPienaar Brothers will also be 
undertaken. 
1.5 Overview of Chapters 
The purpose of the next chapter will be to define what is meant when I refer to retrospective 
laws and the practice of legislation by press release throughout this dissertation.  
Chapter 3 will explore whether there are any provisions in the 1996 Constitution which 
prohibit the retrospective introduction of legislation. This analysis will focus in particular 
on: 
 the Rule of Law; and 
 Section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
In dealing with the practice of legislation by press release as a particular form of 
retrospective law, the analysis will focus on whether this practice has the potential to violate 
the principle of Separation of Powers. 
An analysis of the legality of retrospective tax legislation is not sufficient to resolve many 
of the concerns commonly associated therewith. Chapter 4 will analyse the practice of 
introducing retrospective tax legislation and that of legislation by press release against a 
selection of the commonly accepted principles of good tax policy design, namely: 
 the Principle of Certainty; 
 the Principle of Tax Neutrality; and  
 the Principle of Economic Growth and Efficiency. 
As Pienaar Brothersrepresented the first time that the passing of retrospective tax 
legislation was challenged on constitutional grounds, Chapter 5 will focus on this case. 
Firstly, a brief outline of the facts will be provided, and thereafter an examination of the 
arguments relied on by counsel for the taxpayer and the Commissioner will be undertaken. 
An analysis of the judgment and the reasons therefore will then be undertaken.  
Chapter 6 will focus on a critical analysis of the Pienaar Brothers judgment in light of the 
legal and policy principles dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4.  
12 
 
Chapter 7 will conclude with an overview of the preceding chapters. In addition, 
recommendations which should guide the practice of introducing retrospective tax 
legislation and the practice of legislation by press release will be put forth.  
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2. RETROSPECTIVE LAW-MAKING AND THE PRACTICE OF 
LEGISLATION BY PRESS RELEASE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the primary issues that arises when debating retrospective laws is that the very 
definition of the term ‘retrospective laws’ is uncertain. It is therefore essential that at the 
outset I define what I mean when I refer to retrospective laws. This definition is particularly 
important as some of the arguments commonly relied upon to argue against such laws only 
apply to particular formulations of this term. Thus, the broader the definition adopted, the 
less compelling the arguments against such laws as a whole become as some arguments 
only apply to limited categories of such laws.  
Once an acceptable definition of the term‘retrospective laws’ has been identified, it will 
then be necessary to define what the practice of legislation by press release refers to and 
how it is utilised.  
2.2 Defining Retrospective Laws 
In the context of tax legislation, Graetz7 argues that the distinction between retrospective 
and prospective laws is merely illusory. The reason for this is because all changes in law 
will have an economic impact on: 
 the value of existing assets; or 
 existing expectations 
 
When taxpayers are making the decision of whether or not to enter into a particular 
transaction, and the manner in which such transaction is to be structured, they form 
suppositions as to what will reasonably be expected to follow from such action. It is highly 
possible however that an intervening change in the law could derail this and result in the 
expected consequence not eventuating. It may further be possible that the taxpayer will be 
faced with a new and unexpected consequence, which is not desirable, and which cannot 
be avoided due to source of such consequence being in the past. It is submitted that a 
                                                          
7 M J Graetz ‘Retroactivity Revisited’ (1985) 98 Harvard Law Review 1822.  
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possible solution to this temporal issue is to rather define retrospective laws in the context 
of the manner in which such laws are applied.    
Driedger8 defines a retrospective law as being one which ‘attaches new consequences to an 
event that occurred prior to its enactment’.9Driedger further distinguishes between 
‘retroactive’ laws and ‘retrospective’ laws as follows: 
‘A retroactive statute is one that operates backwards, that is to say, it is operative as of 
a time prior to its enactment. It makes the law different from what it was during the 
period of its enactment.’10 
Driedger further defines a retrospective law as being: 
‘Changes only the law for the future, but it looks to the past and attaches new... 
consequences to completed transactions... A retrospective statute operates as of a past 
time in a sense that it opens up a closed transaction and changes its consequences, 
although the change is effective only for the future.’11 
Munzer12 has developed a similar theory to that of Driedger, except that he has termed the 
two types of retroactive rules ‘strongly retroactive rules’ and ‘weakly retroactive rules.’ 
According to Munzer, strongly retroactive rules are backward-looking, in that ‘they change 
the legal consequences of prior events from the date at which the event occurred.’13 On the 
other hand, weakly retroactive rules are forward-looking, in that ‘they change the legal 
consequences of prior events, but only from the date of the creation of the rule.’14Driedger 
would therefore regard a strongly retroactive rule as being retroactive, and a weakly 
retroactive rule as being retrospective.  
In order to illustrate the contrast between strong and weak retroactive laws Munzer uses 
the example of the passing of a retroactive law validating a previously invalid marriage. 
According to Munzer, if the law in question is strongly retroactive, the marriage will be 
                                                          
8 E A Driedger ‘Statutes: Retroactive Retrospective Reflections’ (1978) 56 Canadian Bar Review.  
9Driedger (note 8 above) 276. 
10 E A Driedger ‘Construction of Statutes’ (1983) 185-186. 
11Driedger (note 10 above) 185-186. 
12 S R Munzer ‘Retroactive Law’ (1977) 6 J. Legal Study. 
13Munzer (note 12 above) 383.  
14Munzer (note 12 above) 383. 
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regarded as having always been valid. If however the law is weakly retroactive, the 
marriage will be deemed to be valid as from the date of the passing of the law. In the latter 
case, the law does not serve to erase the period of invalidity.15 In Munzer’s theory, the 
intervening law that results in a reasonably expected consequence not arising would be 
deemed to be a weakly retroactive law.  
The transitional issues that arise as a result of the operation of weakly retroactive laws have 
resulted in an entire field of study being dedicated thereto, which is unfortunately beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. It is submitted however that for the purpose of the current 
study the term retrospective laws will mean those laws which Munzer classifies as being 
strongly retroactive. Where weakly retrospective laws are being referred to, this will be 
stated. Having defined retrospective laws, it is necessary to deal with a particular form of 
such laws, namely the practice of legislation by press release. 
2.3 Legislation by Press Release 
Palmer &Sampford16 regard the practice of legislation by press release as a particular 
category of retrospective legislation. Nash17 describes the practice of legislation by press 
release as follows: 
‘... the Treasurer announces that as from today or next week the law will be so and so. 
At some subsequent stage, legislation embodying the substance of what the minister 
said is introduced into Parliament and eventually passed either in its original form or in 
an amended form.’18 
In the South African context, the practice is implemented by way of the Minister of Finance 
giving notice of amendments to tax legislation in his budget speech for a particular year in 
question, which amendments will apply with effect from that date, notwithstanding the fact 
that they will only be promulgated on some future date. There can be no doubt that this 
practice constitutes a form of retrospective law-making, in that the announcement itself 
cannot be said to have changed the law. Once promulgated however, such laws will change 
                                                          
15Munzer (note 12 above) 383. 
16 A Palmer & C Sampford ‘Retrospective Legislation in Australia: Looking Back at the 1980s’ (1993) 22 Federal 
Law Review 235.  
17 G Nash ‘Retrospective Legislation’ (1981) The Australian Accountant, October. 
18 Nash (note 17 above) 594. 
16 
 
the legal consequences of events that took place prior to their enactment. It is for this reason 
that despite the derisive term legislation by press release being widely adopted to describe 
this practice, a more accurate approach is to regard this practice as being a particular 
category of retrospective legislation, namely ‘retrospective to the date of announcement.’19 
It is submitted that the primary reason why the practice of legislation by press release is 
utilised is as a result of the lengthy legislative process. It is feared that in the period of time 
between the announcement of impending legislative amendments, and the eventual passing 
of such legislation, enterprising taxpayers will accelerate their transactions in order to take 
advantage of a tax benefit that has been brought to their attention. For this reason the 
amendment in question is made retrospective to the date of the announcement, thereby 
preventing a potential lane of tax avoidance from becoming a freeway.20 
2.4 Conclusion 
The terms retrospective legislation and legislation by press release will be used repeatedly 
throughout this study and it was thus necessary that they were defined at the outset. The 
Chapter that follows will examine the commonly relied upon constitutional law arguments 
against the retrospective introduction of tax legislation and attempt to determine whether 
there are any validity in these. I also analyse whether the practice of legislation by press 
release adequately addresses these arguments, and further identify whether such practice 
raises any additional constitutional issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 235. 
20  Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 264.  
17 
 
 
3. THE 1996 CONSTITUTION  
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the retrospective introduction of tax legislation will be weighed against the 
following constitutional provisions: 
 the Rule of Law; 
 the right to property as contained in Section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution; and 
 the Principle of Separation of Powers (in the specific context of the practice of 
legislation by press release). 
 
The starting point to challenge any legislation should be the 1996 Constitution. In his article 
dealing with constitutional law and taxpayer’s rights in South Africa, Croome21 states that 
‘whenever facing a legal problem including a tax dispute, the rights contained in the 
Constitution must not be overlooked.’22Croome is critical of the practice of retrospective 
tax legislation, and went so far as to address the Constitutional Assembly at the time of the 
drafting of the Constitution in an effort to include a specific provision prohibiting the 
retrospective introduction of fiscal legislation. Notwithstanding this request, such provision 
was not included in the Constitution and as a result thereof any taxpayer seeking to 
challenge the constitutionality of retrospective legislation must do so against the existing 
provisions of the 1996 Constitution.23 As the Rule of Law is the most commonly cited 
constitutional provision relied upon to argue against the retrospective introduction of tax 
legislation, the validity of such argument will be dealt with first.  
3.2 The Rule of Law 
                                                          
21B Croome ‘Constitutional Law and taxpayer’s rights in South Africa-an overview’ (2002) Act Juridica. 
22Croome (note 21 above) 1. 
23 B CroomeTaxpayer’s Rights in South Africa; An analysis and evaluation of the extent to which the powers of 
the South African Revenue Service comply with the Constitutional rights to property, privacy, administrative 
justice, access to information and access to courts (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2008) 58-
59. 
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The Rule of Law is entrenched in Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution, which states inter 
alia that: 
‘The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on 
the following values: 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law...’ 
InPresident of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,24Mokgoro J, in her concurring 
judgment held that: 
‘The need for accessibility, precision and general application flow from the concept of 
the rule of law. A person should be able to know of the law, and be able to conform his 
or her conduct to the law.’25 
Based on the very definition of retrospective legislation, it is clear that such legislation 
undermines the principle of the rule of law as interpreted by Mokgoro J. It is impossible 
for a taxpayer to ‘know the law’ and to be able to ‘conform his or her conduct to the law’ 
when such law was not in existence at the time that the taxpayer was planning his or her 
affairs. One of the benefits accorded to taxpayers living in a society in which the Rule of 
Law is entrenched in the founding values of the Constitution should be that at the time 
when they are planning to enter into a transaction, they do so with full knowledge of what 
the tax consequences of such transaction will be. This can only be achieved if such taxpayer 
has knowledge of the laws applicable at that point in time, and armed with such knowledge 
he can consequently plan and act with a degree of certainty. It is therefore clear that the 
principle Rule of Law and the principle of certainty, which is dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 5 below, are inextricably intertwined.  
As it has been determined that the uncertainty created by the retrospective introduction of 
tax legislation does indeed undermine the Rule of Law, the question which then arises is 
whether the Rule of Law can be relied upon to successfully challenge such legislation and 
to have it set aside. 
In dealing with the nature of the Rule of Law, and how it fits into the South African legal 
framework on a practical level, the Court inMinister of Home Affairs v National Institute 
                                                          
24President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
25Hugo (note 24 above) 102.  
19 
 
for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO) and Others26 stated 
that: 
‘The values enunciated in section 1 of the Constitution are of fundamental importance. 
They inform and give substance to all the provisions of the Constitution. They do not, 
however, give rise to discrete and enforceable rights in themselves. This is clear not 
only from the language of section 1 itself, but also from the way the Constitution is 
structured and in particular the provisions of chapter 2 which contains the Bill of 
Rights.’27 
At base level, the simplest constitutional challenge that can be relied upon to have a law 
declared invalid would proceed as follows: 
 a law is passed that unjustly deprives an individual of property; 
 such individual approaches a Court and relies on the provisions of Section 25 of the 
1996 Constitution to argue that his right to not be unjustly deprived of his property 
has been violated; and 
 the Court orders that the legislation in question be declared to be invalid to the extent 
that the constitutional right of the taxpayer has been violated. 
 
Unfortunately, as the Rule of Law does not create an enforceable right, a taxpayer cannot 
argue that because a retrospective tax law created uncertainty as to what the law was at the 
time that he entered into a transaction, and thereby undermined the Rule of Law, such law 
must be set aside due to the fact that one of his constitutional rights was violated. In order 
to explain this point further, Devenish states: 
‘The rule of law provides for a weak form of constitutionalism, since as Jowell explains, 
no English court would strike down legislation that introduced punishment without trial, 
or statute with retrospective effect. Nonetheless, he argues that respect for the rule of 
law might inhibit the legislature from passing such laws.’28 
                                                          
26Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO) 
and Others 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC). 
27NICRO Case (note 26 above).  
28 G E Devenish Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) 14. 
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InAnglo Platinum Management Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Others29the Applicant attempted to challenge the validity of regulations that 
had been introduced with retrospective effect. In dealing with such challenge, Van Oosten 
J stated: 
‘To revert to the question relating to retrospectivity. The rule against retrospectivity has 
become firmly entrenched in administrative law. It is founded upon the principle of legal 
certainty which in turn is derived from the rule of law. Where the exercise of powers 
affects rights and/or legitimate expectations retrospectivity clearly undermines the 
constitutional principle of the rule of law. This aspect received the attention of the 
Constitutional Court in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: 
In re Ex part President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) paragraph 
[39] where the following extract from De Smith, Woolf and Jowell Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action 5 ed at 14-14 was quoted with approval: “... In addition, the rule 
of law embraces some internal qualities of all public law: that it should be certain, that 
is ascertainable in advance so as to be predictable and not retrospective in its operation; 
and that it be applied equally, without unjustifiable differentiation.”’30 
In Anglo Platinum the regulations challenged by the taxpayer were ultimately held to be 
invalid due to procedural flaws at the time that they were passed. This is unfortunate as it 
rendered it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether legislation could be set aside 
due to the fact that it violated the Rule of Law. This is still an issue that has not been decided 
on by our Courts. It is submitted however that as the Rule of Law does not create any 
enforceable rights, taxpayers will find it difficult to challenge retrospective legislation on 
this basis. A stronger argument for taxpayers will be to challenge the uncertainty that arises 
from the introduction of retrospective tax legislation from a policy perspective, which will 
be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 4. 
3.2.1 The Rule of Law and Legislation by Press Release 
As identified in Chapter 2, there is no doubt that the practice of legislation by press release 
constitutes a form of retrospective law-making. However, the issue that needs to be 
                                                          
29Anglo Platinum Management Services (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and Others 2000 
(1) SA 1127 (SCA). 
30Anglo Platinum (note 29 above) 1145. 
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determined is whether this practice adequately resolves the argument that retrospective 
laws undermine the Rule of Law.  
The primary argument levelled against retrospective legislation is that it undermines the 
Rule of Law due to the uncertainty that it creates. To put it simply, the taxpayer’s argument 
would therefore be that his ability to plan his tax affairs in accordance with what the law 
was at the time that he entered into a transaction was undermined by such legislation, 
thereby violating the Rule of Law. It is submitted that the strength of this argument is 
somewhat weakened in instances where the taxpayer was given prior notice of the 
impending change, as in the case of legislation by press release. 
 It is submitted that in instances where the Minister of Finance gives notice of impending 
changes to tax legislation, which amendments will take effect on the date of the 
announcement, notwithstanding that they will only be promulgated on some future date, do 
not undermine the Rule of Law provided that: 
i. The eventual promulgation of the legislation is not unduly delayed; and 
ii. The promulgated legislation closely resembles the amendments that were initially 
announced by the Minister.  
Where the above requirements are met, the issues surrounding the uncertainty of legislation 
are adequately resolved. This is however not always the case. The procedure to pass Money 
Bills requires numerous stakeholders to be involved in the decision-making process, and 
this has the potential to result in the eventual promulgated legislation either differing greatly 
from what was originally announced, or alternatively not being promulgated at all. Given 
the high probability of this occurring, taxpayers will always be wary of relying on 
announcements made by the Minister, thereby adding an additional element of uncertainty 
to the decision-making process. In the next sub-chapter the retrospective introduction of 
tax legislation will be challenged against taxpayers’ Constitutional right to property.  
3.3 The Constitutional Right to Property 
Section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution provides that: 
‘(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit the arbitrary deprivation of property. 
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(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application 
 (a) for public purpose or in the public interest; and 
 (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
 payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
 approved by a court.’ 
It is trite law that rights contained in the Bill of Rights, including those contained in section 
25(1) of the 1996 Constitution, are not absolute. InS v Makwanyane and 
Another,31Chakalson P stated: 
‘The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in 
a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an 
assessment based on proportionality. This is implicit in the provisions of Section 33(1). 
The fact that different rights have different implications for democracy and, in the case 
of our Constitution, for ‘an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality’, 
means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining 
reasonableness and necessity. Principles can be established, but the application of those 
principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. This is 
inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different 
interests.’32 
The drafters of the 1996 Constitution clearly took cognisance of Chakalson P’s statement 
above when drafting Section 36(1) of the Constitution, which reads: 
‘The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including- 
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) The nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
                                                          
31S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391. 
32Makwanyane (note 31 above) 104. 
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(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.’ 
In determining whether a right as contained in the Bill of Rights has been unjustifiably 
limited, our Courts have adopted a two-stage approach. Firstly, the Court enquires as to 
whether the provision being challenged has infringed a right as contained in the Bill of 
Rights. If the answer to this first question is in the affirmative, the Court must then 
determine whether such infringement is justifiable. In Ex Parte Minister of Safety and 
Security and Others: In RE S v Walters and Another,33 the court elaborated on the two-
stage enquiry, stating: 
‘First, there is the threshold enquiry aimed at determining whether or not the enactment 
in question constitutes a limitation of one or other guaranteed right. This entails 
examining (a) the content and scope of the relevant protected right(s) and (b) the 
meaning and effect of the impugned enactment to see whether there is any limitation of 
(a) by (b). Subsections (1) and (2) of S39 of the Constitution give guidance as to the 
interpretation of both the rights and the enactment, essentially requiring them to be 
interpreted so as to promote the value system of an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom. If upon such analysis no limitation is found, 
that is the end of the matter. The constitutional challenge is dismissed there and then. If 
there is indeed a limitation, however, the second stage ensues. This is ordinarily called 
the limitations exercise. In essence this requires the weighing up of the nature and 
importance of the right(s) that are limited together with the extent of the limitation as 
against the importance and purpose of the limiting enactment. Section 36(1) of the 
Constitution spells out these factors that have to be put into the scales in making a 
proportional evaluation of all the counterpoised rights and interests involved.’34 
Whilst by their very nature taxes deprive individuals of their property, where such taxes 
are introduced prospectively they cannot be said to be contrary to the provisions of section 
25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. This is because the State requires the funds received from 
taxpayers in order to fulfil its Constitutional mandate. In such instances, the deprivation of 
property takes place as a direct consequence of the liability to pay taxes and is therefore 
neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The question that needs to be dealt with is whether a 
taxpayer could successfully challenge an amendment to the Income Tax Act on the basis 
                                                          
33Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In Re S v Walters and Another 2002 (4) SA 613. 
34Walters (note 33 above) 27. 
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that it was introduced with retrospective effect, applied to an already completed transaction, 
and thus violated his constitutional right to property. 
Croome argues that a taxpayer will find it difficult to challenge retrospective tax legislation 
on the basis that it constitutes an unlawful violation of the constitutional right to property 
as contained in section 25. The reasons identified by Croome include:    
i.  The Income Tax Act and the TLAA are laws of general application; 
ii. As fiscal legislation applies to taxpayers generally, it is difficult to argue that they 
are arbitrary and thus unlawful; 
iii. The collection of taxes arises as a direct result of the government’s obligation to 
fulfil its constitutional mandate; and 
iv. This practice is followed by many other open and democratic societies.  
As identified in Chapter 2, retrospective tax legislation is generally relied on in instances 
where it has been identified that there is a loophole in legislation that is granting taxpayers 
an unintended tax benefit, or where it is necessary to prevent further harm to the fiscus. It 
is submitted that once a taxpayer has successfully proven that a retrospective tax law has 
deprived him of his constitutional right to property, he will find it difficult to pass the 
second stage of the enquiry. This is because the limiting measure does serve a legitimate 
purpose (being the raising of revenue or alternatively the protection of the fiscus) and 
secondly that it is rationally connected to its stated purpose (it being generally argued that 
retrospective tax legislation is passed to close a loophole in an Act or to prevent further 
harm to the fiscus). In the next sub-chapter it will be analysed whether the practice of 
legislation by press release violates the principle of Separation of Powers.  
3.4 Separation of Powers 
In terms of Constitutional Principle VI, the Constitution is required to have: 
‘A separation of power between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with 
appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.’ 
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In dealing with this principle, the Court in South African Association of Personal Injury 
Lawyers v Heath35 stated that: 
‘The separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government was an 
important aspect of the separation of powers required by the Constitution. It was 
essential to the role of the courts under the Constitution. Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures made the laws but did not implement them. Under the Constitution it was 
the duty of the courts to ensure that the limits to the exercise of public power were not 
transgressed. Crucial to the discharge of that duty was that the courts be and be seen to 
be independent.’36 
Under the 1996 Constitution, and in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, 
the national government is divided into three categories, namely: 
i. The National Parliament – being the branch of government tasked with making the 
law; 
ii. The National Executive – being the branch of government tasked with executing 
the law; and 
iii. The Judiciary – being the branch of government tasked with resolving disputes. 
 It is submitted that the purpose of dividing the powers of governmentis to increase 
administrative efficiency as well as to decrease the opportunities for the abuse of the powers 
conferred upon each branch. In order to determine whether the practice of legislation by 
press release violates the principle of Separation of Powers, a brief analysis of the 
legislative process relating to Money Bills must first be undertaken. 
Section 77(1) of the 1996 Constitution defines a Bill as being a Money Bill if it ‘imposes 
national taxes, levies duties or surcharges.’ In terms of section 77(3) of the 1996 
Constitution, Money Bills must be considered in accordance with the procedure as set out 
in section 77(5) of the 1996 Constitution, and that an Act must be passed to provide for the 
procedure to amend Money Bills before Parliament.  
                                                          
35South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC). 
36Heath (note 35 above) 79. 
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In accordance with the provisions of section 77(3) of the 1996 Constitution the Money Bills 
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act37 (‘the Money Bill Act’) was passed. In 
terms of Section 11of the Money Bill Act, all Revenue Bills must inter alia: 
i. Firstly ‘be referred to the Committee on Finance of the National Assembly for 
consideration and report;’38 and 
ii. Thereafter, once the National Assembly has passed the Revenue Bill, ‘it must be 
referred to the National Council of Provinces.’39 
Whilst our Courts have recognised that there is no provision in the 1996 Constitution which 
prohibits the Legislature from delegating its law-making powers to other Constitutional 
bodies, regard must be had to the wording of the empowering text conferring the legislative 
power in question. InExecutive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others40it was stated: 
‘Sometimes [the Constitution] states that “national legislation must”; at other times it 
states that something will be dealt with “as determined by national legislation; and at 
other times it uses the formulation ‘national legislation may”. Where one of the first two 
formulations is used, it seems to me to be a strong indication that the legislative power 
may not be delegated by the Legislature, although this will of course depend upon 
context.’41 
Importantly, there is nothing in section 77(3) of the 1996 Constitution, section 77(5) of the 
1996 Constitution nor the Money Bill Act which provides for: 
i. The delegation of powers from the legislature to the executive in respect of the 
passing of revenue bills; nor 
ii. The implementation of legislation prior to the prescribed procedures being 
followed. 
                                                          
37 Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act No. 9 of 2009.  
38 Section 11(1) of the Money Bill Act (note 37 above). 
39 Section 11(2) of the Money Bill Act (note 37 above).  
40Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 1995 (10) BCLR 1289. 
41Executive Council of the Western Cape Legislature (note 40 above) 125. 
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In order to determine whether legislation by press release amounts to a violation of the 
principle of Separation of Powers, it is necessary to distinguish two potential forms that 
this practice may take. Firstly, legislation by press release may operate as a warning to 
taxpayers that they can no longer rely on a particular provision of the Income Tax Act. In 
such situation taxpayers are not directed to act upon such announcement in a positive 
manner, but rather they are merely advised that when structuring a particular transaction, 
they should anticipate that the retrospective operation of the amendment in question may 
adversely impact upon such transaction. At best, they are therefore well-advised to refrain 
from relying on the provision in question. In this situation, it is submitted that the principle 
of Separation of Powers will not be violated, as no legal change is actually deemed to have 
taken place by virtue of the announcement. 
The second form of legislation by press release is more problematic. In terms of this form 
of legislation by press release, taxpayers are directed to take positive actions based on the 
announcement alone, prior to any amendments actually being promulgated. An example of 
this second form of legislation by press release that illustrates how the practice can 
potentially amount to an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Legislature to the 
Executive can be seen in the context of the introduction of section 23K of the Income Tax 
Act which was introduced by the Taxation Laws Amendment Act42 (‘the TLAA’).  
In terms of section 23K of the Income Tax Act, taxpayers were required to make application 
to SARS in order to obtain prior approval for certain intra-group transactions. A failure by 
taxpayers to obtain such approval resulted in them being unable to claim the tax benefits 
applicable to such transactions. In terms of the TLAA section 23K of the Income Tax Act 
was deemed to come into operation on 2 June 2011, notwithstanding the fact that the TLAA 
was only promulgated in January 2012. The consequence of this was that taxpayers entering 
into intra-group transactions between the period of June 2011 and January 2012 were 
placed in a position where they had to make application for approval to SARS in terms of 
a section that was not yet law. Whilst the requirements to pass a Money Bill were ultimately 
followed, that taxpayers were expected to act in accordance with a section that was not yet 
law amounts to de facto law making by the Executive, and is therefore a violation of the 
principle of Separation of Powers. 
                                                          
42Taxation Laws Amendment Act No. 24 of 2011. 
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Once it has been established that legislation by press release may in certain situations, such 
as with the introduction of section 23K of the Income Tax Act, amount to a violation of the 
principle of Separation of Powers, it falls to be determined what the legal consequences for 
such legislation are. This question was dealt with by the Court inTongoane and Others v 
Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others.43 
In Tongoane, the applicants sought to have the Communal Land Rights Act, No 11 of 2004 
set aside on the basis that the incorrect procedure had been followed when it was passed. 
Once the Court established that the applicants were correct in their allegation that the 
incorrect procedure had been followed in the passing of the Act, it then had to determine 
what the consequences of such error were. In this regard the Court referred to the judgment 
in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others,44 where 
it was held that: 
‘It is trite that legislation must conform to the Constitution in terms of both its content 
and the manner in which it was adopted. Failure to comply with manner and form 
requirements in enacting legislation renders the legislation invalid.’45 
In Doctors for Life it was further held that: 
‘.... not only has a right by also a duty to ensure that the law-making process prescribed 
by the Constitution is observed. And if the conditions for law-making processes have 
not been complied with, it has the duty to say so and declare the resulting statute 
invalid.’46 
Based on the above, the Court in Tongoane ruled that the legislative procedure set out in 
section 76 of the 1996 Constitution was a material part of the process of passing laws of 
this nature. It was further held that as a result of this, a failure to meet the requirements 
contained in this section would result in the legislation passed being declared invalid. 
It is submitted that once a Bill has been classified as being a Money Bill, the procedures as 
set out in the Money Bill Act must be followed. As in Tongoane, where the Court held that 
the procedure set out in section 76 of the 1996 Constitution was a material part of the law-
                                                          
43Tongoane and Others v National Minister for Agriculture and Land Affairs and Others 2010 (6) SA 214 CC.  
44Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC). 
45Doctors for Life (note 44 above) 1463. 
46Doctors for Life (note 44 above) 1466. 
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making process, the procedure set out in The Money Bills Act is material to the passing of 
amendments to the Income Tax Act. The reason why such procedure is necessary in relation 
to the passing of amendments to the Income Tax Act is because this is a highly technical 
piece of legislation, and a failure to follow the required procedure may lead to financial 
uncertainty and unintended consequences.47 
It is submitted that where the practice of legislation by press release results in taxpayers 
having to take positive actions in accordance with amendments that have not yet been 
promulgated, such de novo amendments would be unable to withstand Constitutional 
scrutiny and would most likely have to be declared invalid if challenged before a Court. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has scrutinised three of the commonly relied upon Constitutional challenges 
against the retrospective introduction of tax legislation. Whilst it is submitted that such 
legislation creates uncertainty for taxpayers, thereby undermining their ability to plan their 
affairs in accordance with what the law is at such time, the Rule of Law does not create 
enforceable rights and there is therefore no basis on which this provision can be relied upon 
to overturn such legislation. The Rule of Law challenge is further weakened in instances 
where the practice of legislation by press release has been properly utilised by the Minister 
of Finance, as it is difficult for taxpayers to rely on the uncertainty argument where they 
have been given adequate notice of the impending retrospective legislation. 
It is further submitted that in instances where the Legislature has relied upon the 
introduction of retrospective tax legislation to close identified loopholes in the Income Tax 
Act, taxpayers will find it difficult to argue that the application of such amendments to 
completed transactions amounts to a violation of the right to property as contemplated in 
section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. This is because there is a rational connection 
between the amendment in question (the passing of the amendment to close a tax loophole), 
the manner in which it was implemented (being the fact that it was implemented 
retrospectively), and its ultimate goal (the protection of the national fiscus against either a 
real or perceived risk). 
                                                          
47 P De Vos... et al South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) 161. 
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Finally, it is submitted that whilst the practice of legislation by press release, when relied 
upon properly, deals with the primary Rule of Law argument, it also has the potential to 
create an additional constitutional challenge. This additional issue arises when an 
amendment has been announced by the Minister of Finance in the Budget Speech, which 
amendment is to be deemed to be in force from the date of such announcement, and 
taxpayers are expected to take positive actions in accordance with such announcement. The 
problem with this situation is that whilst it is accepted that ultimately the prescribed 
legislative procedure will be followed, this expectation that taxpayers must arrange their 
affairs in accordance with the announcement amounts to de novo law-making by the 
Executive. There is nothing in the Money Bill Act which provides for a delegation of 
legislative power by the Legislature to the Executive in respect of amendments to the 
Income Tax Act, nor that authorises the practice of legislation by press release. If 
challenged by taxpayers, it is therefore unlikely that such legislation would stand up to 
constitutional scrutiny.  
The Chapter that follows will test the retrospective introduction of tax legislation and the 
practice of legislation by press release against the guiding principles of good tax policy 
design in order to determine whether there are any policy arguments that can be relied upon 
to challenge this form of law-making.  
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4. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF GOOD TAX POLICY DESIGN 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Whilst the legal challenges against the retrospective introduction of tax legislation were 
dealt with in the previous Chapter, the decision of whether or not to implement such taxes 
forms an important policy consideration in any tax system. In this chapter the policy of 
retrospectively introducing tax legislation and the practice of legislation by press release 
will be analysed against a selection of the accepted principles of good tax policy. 
Unfortunately, the study of tax policy is a complex field and it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to undertake a thorough examination of all areas of it. It is for this reason that 
the scope of this examination has been limited and only those policies that have been 
identified as being the most relevant for present purposes will be dealt with (and even then 
not in enough detail to truly do them justice).48 
4.2 Relevance of Tax Policy Design 
At a base level, the development of good tax policy design can be described as being the 
endeavour to identify a set of principles that can be utilised to: 
 analyse proposals that have been put forth to change tax rules and tax systems; and 
 to provide an objective approach in order to evaluate and improve the existing tax 
rules.49 
 
In dealing with the nature of the tax policy principles, Alley & Bentley50 state that whilst 
the general principles do not in themselves create legally or morally enforceable rights, 
‘once the law is developed based on these principles, legislation will transform some of 
their content into enforceable rights and obligations.’51 It is therefore submitted that once a 
                                                          
48 The three principles that will be dealt with in this Chapter are those of certainty, economic growth and efficiency 
and tax neutrality.   
49 United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee (note 6 above) 3.  
50 C Alley & D Bentley ‘A Remodelling of Adam Smith’s Tax Design Principles’ (2005) 20 Australian Tax 
Forum.  
51 Alley & Bentley (note 50 above) 581. 
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set of accepted principles has been identified, and then relied upon to evaluate and improve 
the tax rules, the end product should be an effective tax system.  
The development of good tax policy design is a complex process in which a balance must 
be sought between the objectives of the tax policy in question and the requirements of the 
individuals being subjected to such taxes. A failure to implement tax policy that is broadly 
perceived fair by the individuals being subjected thereto can have far reaching 
consequences at all levels of Government.52 As a result, numerous academics and 
commissions53 have attempted to identify a standardised set of principles of what 
constitutes a good tax system. A non-exhaustive list of some of the more popular sets of 
principles can be seen in annexure ‘A’ to this dissertation.   
It is widely accepted that Smith54 identified the initial principles of taxation which have 
significantly influenced tax policy design.55 Whilst other scholars have proposed additional 
principles, the principles put forward by Smith remain the most commonly referred to.56 
The criteria for an efficient tax system as identified by Smith are: ‘Equality, Certainty, 
Convenience of Payment and Economy of Collection.’57 
In its guiding principles of good tax policy, the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (‘AICPA’) has built on the four principles identified by Smith and created an 
extended list of principles that are relevant to the creation of good taxes, calling them ‘the 
ten principles of good tax policy.’58 The six additional principles identified by the AICPA 
                                                          
52Bronkhorst E ‘Principles of Tax Policy Design’ in Stiglingh M (ed) SILKE: South African Income Tax 19 ed 
Volume 2 (2017) 1187. 
53 See for example, A Smith ‘An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’ (selected edition, 
1993) 450; AICPA ‘Guiding Principles of Good Tax Policy: A Framework for Evaluating Tax Proposals’ (2017) 
available at https://www.aicpa.org/ADVOCACY/TAX/downloadabledocuments/tax-policy-concept-statement-
no-1-global.pdf (accessed 11 April 2018); Alley & Bentley (note 50 above). 
54Smith (note 53 above) 450. 
55 Bronkhorst (note 52 above) 1187; AICPA (note 53 above) 6; Alley & Bentley (note 50 above) 586. 
56Bronkhorst (note 50 above) 1187. 
57 Smith (note 51 above) 307-308. 
58 AICPA (note 53 above). Although the AICPA is a foreign-based institution, it is submitted that these principles 
are of universal application and are therefore relevant within the South African context.  
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are; ‘simplicity, neutrality, economic growth and efficiency, transparency and visibility, 
minimum tax gap and appropriate government revenues.’59 
Whilst it is recognised that the principles of good tax policy exist as a ‘tax ecosystem’ and 
should not be dealt with in isolation,60 it is submitted that for the purposes of the current 
study the three most important principles to be dealt with in detail are those of: 
 Certainty; 
 Economic Growth and Efficiency; and  
 Neutrality. 
 
4.3 The Principle of Certainty 
The AICPA defines the principle of certainty as meaning that ‘the tax rules should clearly 
specify how the amount of payment is determined, when payment of the tax should occur, 
and how payment is made.’61 Under this principle it is also stated that ‘taxpayers should 
have the ability to determine their tax liabilities with reasonable certainty based on the 
nature of their transactions.’62 The AICPA further states: 
‘Certainty is important to a tax system because it helps to improve compliance with the 
rules and to increase respect for the system. Certainty generally comes from clear 
statutes as well as timely and understandable administrative guidance that is readily 
available to the taxpayer.’63 
In applying this definition to the retrospective introduction of tax laws, Salve64 states: ‘A 
retrospective amendment hardly qualifies as a sensible measure by this yardstick.’65 What 
Salve is referring to in making this statement is that the retrospective introduction of tax 
legislation creates significant uncertainty for taxpayers, in that such laws undermine 
                                                          
59 AICPA (note 53 above) 23. 
60Bronkhorst (note 52 above) 1187. 
61 AICPA (note 53 above) 11. 
62 AICPA (note 53 above) 11. 
63 AICPA (note 53 above) 11. 
64 H Salve ‘Retrospective Taxation – The Indian Experience’ available at 
https://www.biicl.org/files/6722_panel_two_harish_salve.pdf (accessed 12 April 2018) 24-35. 
65 Salve (note 64 above) 24-35. 
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taxpayers’ abilities to plan their affairs in accordance with what the law is at the time when 
decisions are made.  
It is clear from the various formulations of the principle of certainty that it is founded in 
the belief that taxpayers are entitled to rely on the law as a guide for their conduct. Whilst 
it is submitted that as a general rule the ability to rely on the law should be valued, it will 
now be tested against two specific situations, namely:  
i. When the practice of legislation by press release has been relied upon to introduce 
retrospective amendments to the Income Tax Act; and 
ii. When taxpayers are employing aggressive tax planning schemes in order to exploit 
loopholes in the Income Tax Act.  
4.3.1 The Practice of Legislation by Press Release 
It is again submitted that the reliance by taxpayers’ on laws remaining the same is 
undermined when the practice of legislation by press release has been utilised. The reason 
for this is that ‘no reasonable person would rely on a law remaining the same when the 
Minister has specifically said that it will be changed.’66 
In dealing with taxpayers’ reliance on the law remaining the same, Fisch67 distinguishes 
between what she regards as being a stable and an unstable equilibrium. Fisch describes a 
stable legal equilibrium as follows: 
‘A particular legal context is in stable equilibrium when the applicable legal rules are 
clear, have been promulgated by a higher legal authority, have persisted over time and 
in a variety of specific cases, and have not been widely criticised or questioned by 
lawmakers with comparable authority.’68 
Where the above requirements are met, the reliance by taxpayers on the law remaining the 
same can be seen as legitimate. If however, these requirements are not met, then it will be 
regarded as being an unstable equilibrium and changes in legal rules are to be expected. It 
is submitted that in general the legal context of tax laws is to be regarded as being an 
unstable equilibrium. One only needs to look at the Income Tax Act and how often it is 
                                                          
66 Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 263. 
67 J E Fisch ‘Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach’ (1997) 110 Harvard Law Review. 
68Fisch (note 67 above) 1102. 
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amended by the Legislature in order to come to this conclusion. Furthermore, once an 
announcement of impending amendments has been made by the Minister of Finance, the 
situation becomes even more unstable and taxpayers should not then complain when the 
changes are subsequently implemented. The reliance on laws remaining the same in this 
context is therefore misplaced and illegitimate.   
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is still the potential for the practice of legislation by 
press release to increase uncertainty for taxpayers when it is not implemented correctly. An 
examination of the ideal manner in which to use legislation by press release will now be 
undertaken. 
4.3.1.1 Guidelines for Legislation by Press Release 
As stated above, whilst legislation by press release has the potential to adequately resolve 
the uncertainty issues commonly associated with retrospective legislation, it must adhere 
to certain standards in order to remain effective. In order to establish the standards which 
legislation by press release must adhere to, it is first necessary to identify the common 
arguments made against this practice. The primary arguments against the practice of 
legislation by release can be concisely summarised as follows: 
i. That the announcements may be insufficiently clear;69 
ii. That the promulgated legislation may differ from the amendment that was originally 
announced;70 
iii. That there is often a lengthy delay between the date of the announcement of the 
proposed amendment, and the promulgation of the legislation (in certain instances 
the legislation has indeed never come into existence at all);71 and 
                                                          
69 See for example H Reicher ‘Legislation by Press Release’ (1978) 7 Australian Tax Review 32; Palmer & 
Sampford (note 16 above) 267-268. 
70 See for example Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 269-270; J C Chen ‘The Yet-to-Be Effective but Effective 
Tax: Hong Kong’s Buyer’s Stamp Duty as a Critical Case Study of Legislation by Press Release (2014) 10 (E) 
University of Pennsylvania East Asia Law Review 16.  
71 See for example Reicher (note 69 above) 38; Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 268-269. 
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iv. That the announcements are not adequately disseminated to the public.72 
Whilst it is submitted that it is possible for announcements to be so vague as to render their 
ability to guide taxpayers’ actions null and void, there does not appear to be any examples 
of this in practice. Those against the practice of legislation by press release may adopt the 
argument put forth by Reicher,73 who stated that the Government may intentionally make 
insufficiently clear announcements so that ‘the threat will be more effective than the deed 
itself.’74 It is therefore important that one remains cognisant of the fact that vague 
announcements can be a powerful tool to deter negative taxpayer behaviour, but that in 
serving this purpose it undermines the positive associations with the practice of legislation 
by press release. Policy-makers are therefore well-advised to ensure that if they are going 
to rely on the practice of legislation by press release, the initial announcements should be 
as clear as possible.   
With regards to the second criticism of legislation by press release, it is submitted that one 
cannot argue against the potential that the promulgated legislation will differ from what 
was originally announced. The legislative process is (for good reason) a protracted affair 
and involves numerous stakeholders having input on the laws that are eventually 
promulgated. However, it is further submitted that this does not necessarily mean that 
taxpayers’ reliance is undermined by this practice. When an announcement is made, it will 
generally highlight a specific harmful practice that is being targeted by the proposed 
amendment. Taxpayers should therefore adopt a purposive approach to the interpretation 
of the announcement. If this purposive approach is adopted then taxpayers ‘will probably 
refrain not only from the practice identified but also from any variants of it which create 
the same mischief as the practice identified, but which might happen to fall outside the 
precise terms of the announcement, or the tax adviser’s interpretation of it.’75 
Based on the above, when taxpayers literally interpret an announcement, and act on it as if 
it is already law, such taxpayers cannot be said to be acting on a rational basis. With this in 
                                                          
72A Report by the Committee on Tax Policy, Tax Section, New York State Bar Association ‘Retroactivity of Tax 
Legislation’ (1975) 29(1) Tax Lawyer. Although this is a Report from a foreign jurisdiction, it is submitted that 
the concerns raised regarding the dissemination of the notice are applicable within the South African context. 
73 Reicher (note 69 above).  
74Reicher (note 69 above) 32. 
75 Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 268. 
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mind, it is therefore important that policy-makers explain to taxpayers what the practice of 
press release entails, as armed with this knowledge taxpayers will then have reasonable 
expectations regarding the announcements.    
An undue delay in the promulgation of the announced legislation may cause a degree of 
uncertainty amongst taxpayers as it poses the question of whether the announced legislation 
will ever in fact be introduced. To a certain degree the practice of legislation by press 
release creates a period where there is in fact no governing law, and in this period taxpayers 
can only rely on the announcement as a guide for their conduct. One must question how 
long taxpayers can reasonably be expected to act in accordance with such an 
announcement, before they return to what the actual law is as contained in the legislation 
being amended. In order to eliminate this element of uncertainty, it is desirable that a 
specific cut-off time be specified for the amendment in question to be promulgated, ‘failing 
which the retrospective element should not be proceeded with.’76 It is submitted that whilst 
the setting of a deadline is difficult and may result in there being unrealistic expectations, 
this still constitutes a desirable practice as lengthy delays can only serve to decrease the 
credibility of future announcements.77 
In its report dealing with the retroactivity of tax legislation, the Committee on Tax Policy 
of the New York State Bar Association78 identified that one of the primary concerns with 
the practice of legislation by press release (or as it termed in the Report ‘Notice Theory’) 
was whether it could be said that an announcement in question had been adequately 
disseminated to the public. The basis for this concern is that the argument that legislation 
by press release resolves the uncertainty issues associated with retrospective legislation can 
only be sustained if taxpayers are actually made aware of the announcement in question. 
The Committee goes further to state that in order for taxpayer’s to be expected to rely on 
the notice, ‘Congress and the executive should, at the least, adopt a policy of immediate 
and widespread dissemination of actions relating to the proposed changes.’79 It is submitted 
therefore that actual notice of the impending legislative amendments is not sufficient to 
adequately resolve the uncertainty issues relating to retrospective tax laws, but rather 
                                                          
76Reicher (note 69 above) 38. 
77 Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 269. 
78 New York State Bar Association (note 72 above). 
79 New York State Bar Association (note 72 above) 21. 
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taxpayers should see the Government taking constructive steps towards implementing the 
amendment in question. In order for the practice of legislation by press release to amount 
to good tax policy there should therefore be an initial notice of the impending amendments 
that is disseminated to the public, which notice is then immediately followed up with 
constructive steps towards the implementation of such amendment.    
Based on the above, it is clear that it would be highly beneficial for a ‘best policy guide for 
the practice of legislation by press release’ to be developed. Armed with such a guide, 
Government can ensure that in instances where it is deemed desirable for the practice of 
legislation by press release to be utilised, this is done in the most efficient way possible. 
Whilst it is not an inclusive list, the primary factors that should be met when legislation by 
press release is utilised should be: 
i. That the announcements are sufficiently clear;80 
ii. That there is a period of time set at the outset in terms of which the announced  
legislation must be promulgated;81 and 
iii. That not only is there widespread dissemination of the announcements to the 
general public, but taxpayers should thereafter be able to see the Government taking 
constructive steps to implement the amendment.82 
If these guidelines are followed, the practice of legislation by press release will successfully 
resolve the uncertainty that is commonly associated with retrospective legislation. In such 
circumstances taxpayers’ reliance on the law remaining the same is undermined and cannot 
be seen to be a legitimate expectation. It is now necessary to deal with the second scenario 
in which this reliance can be challenged.  
4.3.2 Certainty in the Context of the Exploitation of Loopholes in the Income Tax Act 
The reliance by taxpayers’ on laws remaining the same can further be challenged in 
situations where taxpayers are employing aggressive tax planning schemes to exploit 
identified loopholes in the Income Tax Act. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will adopt 
                                                          
80 Reicher (note 69 above) 32; Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 267-268.  
81 Reicher (note 69 above) 38; Palmer & Sampford (note 16 above) 269. 
82 New York State Bar Association (note 72 above) 21.  
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the definition of loopholes put forth by Katz,83 who regards loopholes as being ‘seeming 
glitches in the formulation of a law (it could be either statutory or case law) that allow 
clever lawyers to help their clients do things that appear to subvert its purpose.’84 In such 
situations it is necessary to ask whether the reliance by taxpayers on the law remaining the 
same is legitimate, and thereby worthy of protection.  
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into the distinction between tax 
avoidance (which is legal) and tax evasion (which is not legal), in the context of reliance it 
is necessary to understand that unusual and creative schemes which are deployed to gain 
an unintended tax advantage have the potential to move beyond legitimate tax avoidance.85 
In the event of the banning of retrospective legislation, on the basis that it undermines the 
principle of certainty, taxpayers who become aware of unintended tax benefits could be 
encouraged to exploit these. In such situations the only manner in which the fiscus could 
be protected would be to pass prospective amendments that prevent such harm being 
suffered in the future. However, nothing can be done to restrict the harm that has already 
been suffered. Whilst it has been argued that this situation arises as a result of poor law-
making, and that therefore Government should bear the losses that consequently arise,86 it 
is submitted that in reality the harm in question is actually suffered by the collective public 
as a whole and as such conduct of this nature should not be countenanced. On this point 
and in defence of the usage of retrospective tax legislation to close loopholes, Australian 
Senator Gareth Evans stated: 
‘Of course it will create uncertainty to have the possibility of these schemes being struck 
down after the event. That, after all, is the very objective – to operate as a deterrent to 
the future marketing of these schemes and not just a way of collecting lost revenue in 
the past… The starting point in this kind of argument is the proposition that uncertainty 
in law is not itself an unmitigated evil. Its role in the front line in the war against tax 
avoidance schemes is such an eminently noble purpose and one which justifies the 
operation of fully retrospective tax avoidance laws.’87 
                                                          
83 L Katz ‘A Theory of Loopholes’ (2010) 39(1) The Journal of Legal Studies. 
84 Katz (note 83 above) 2. 
85United Kingdom House of Commons Treasury Committee (note 6 above) 20. 
86Loiacono& Mortimer (note 1 above) 112. 
87 Sen Deb (1979) 619-620. 
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It is submitted that as a general rule the principle of certainty, and the idea that taxpayers 
should be able to rely on laws to remain the same, are of fundamental importance to any 
tax system. One can clearly see the rationale behind the argument that in a system where 
the introduction of retrospective tax legislation is a fact of life, there is a heightened chance 
that taxpayers will lose respect for such system and which could lead to decreasing levels 
of compliance therewith. It is further submitted however that tax systems are a complex 
ecosystem and that exceptions to this rule do indeed exist. Firstly, where the practice of 
legislation by press release has been relied upon the arguments that retrospective tax laws 
undermine the principle of certainty are weakened. Secondly, where a taxpayer’s reliance 
on the law remaining the same is illegitimate, and thereby not worthy of protection, such 
retrospective laws are acceptable.      
4.4 Principle of Economic Growth and Efficiency  
Whilst economic growth and efficiency are important for all economies, they are even more 
so for developing economies such as South Africa – a country that is heavily reliant on 
foreign investment. In dealing with the principle of economic growth and efficiency the 
AICPA states: 
‘The tax system should not impede or reduce the productive capacity of the economy. 
The tax system should neither discourage nor hinder national economic goals, such as 
economic growth, capital formation, and international competitiveness. The principle of 
economic growth and efficiency is achieved by a tax system that is aligned with the 
economic principles and goals of the jurisdiction imposing the tax.’88 
India provides a real-world example of the manner in which the uncertainty created by the 
wholesale use of retrospective tax legislation can negatively impact upon a country’s 
international competiveness and thus hinder the national economic goals. 
4.4.1 The Indian Example 
In a country with a developing economy such as South Africa, it is crucial that the tax 
policies adopted do not deter any potential foreign investment.A real-world example of the 
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manner in which the retrospective introduction of tax legislation can potentially be harmful 
to an economy can be seen in another developing economy, namely India.89 
During the course of 2016 the Indian government appointed a committee with the mandate 
to investigate why ‘the World Bank published a report downgrading India in the index of 
investment friendliness.’90 In its findings, the committee addressed the issue of 
retrospective taxation and stated: 
‘It has often been said that death and taxes are equally undesirable aspects of human 
life. Yet, it can be said in favour of death that it is never retrospective. Retrospective 
taxation has the undesirable effect of creating major uncertainties in the business 
environment and constituting a significant disincentive for persons wishing to do 
business in India. While the legal powers of a Government extend to giving 
retrospective effect to taxation proposals, it might not pass the test of certainty and 
continuity. This is a major area where improvements should be attempted sooner rather 
than later...’91 
Whilst the Indian government had adopted a policy of using retrospective tax legislation to 
broaden its tax base, the uncertainty created by such legislation ultimately undermined 
foreign investor confidence in India,92 thereby violating the principle of economic growth 
and efficiency. 
It is submitted that the Indian example provides a cautionary tale that where the practice of 
retrospectively introducing tax legislation is widely and indiscriminately used, such 
practice has the potential to ultimately be harmful to the economy in question. It is further 
submitted however that where this practice is regulated, and only used in specific 
circumstances,93 the practice is less likely to have a negative impact on the economy. It is 
submitted that the reasons for this are: 
                                                          
89 In the United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment Report 2018, Investment and New Industrial Policies 
2018, both India and South Africa are ranked as countries with developing economies.  
90 Salve (note 64 above) 23.  
91 Salve (note 64 above) 23-24. 
92 Lamprecht (note 4 above) 3.  
93 For example to remedy defective legislation.  
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i. That such legislation is relied upon in numerous foreign jurisdictions and is 
essentially an international norm;94 and 
ii. That in such systems there is a degree of transparency related to this practice, 
thereby minimising the potential for such laws to undermine foreign investor 
confidence. 
4.5 Principle of Tax Neutrality 
The AICPA identifies that taxes should be as neutral as possible, so as to ensure that such 
taxes achieve their primary purpose of raising revenue for governmental activities, whilst 
not influencing business and personal decisions.   
The Indian example above provides a real-world illustration of the fact that the introduction 
of retrospective tax has the potential to significantly influence foreign business decisions 
when businesses are deciding whether or not to invest in a country. This therefore amounts 
to an undermining of the principle of tax neutrality. The negative impact of the introduction 
of retrospective tax legislation on business and personal decisions can further be explained 
from the social cost perspective. 
4.5.1 The Social Cost Perspective 
Nellor95 argues that from a social cost perspective, the retrospective introduction of tax 
legislation should be avoided. The reason for this is that in a system where retrospective 
tax legislation is the norm, all choices made by taxpayers will require that they form an 
expectation of future budgetary actions. In such systems, taxpayers cannot confidently 
arrange their affairs in accordance with what the law is at the time when decisions are being 
made. Consequently, the uncertainty that this creates results in taxpayers using additional 
resources in the decision-making process. It is further argued that this additional step in the 
decision-making process would not be present in a system where legislation can only act 
prospectively and thus impact upon future tax arrangements.96 The increased focus on the 
decision-making process detracts from the actual income-producing activities which 
                                                          
94 See Annexure ‘B’ to this dissertation for a table illustrating the countries in which the retrospective introduction 
of tax legislation is permissible. 
95 D Nellor ‘A Note on Retrospectivity and the Tax System’ (1982) 58(162) Economic Record. 
96 Nellor (note 95 above) 289. 
43 
 
taxpayers should be engaged in, thereby undermining the principle of tax neutrality and 
harming the economy as a whole.  
Based on the above, it can be argued that in a system where taxpayers can predict the legal 
consequences of a planned transaction with reasonable certainty, the costs of compliance 
for such taxpayers are small. It is submitted that this will result in taxpayers being more 
likely to comply with the law. Fisch97 states that greater compliance with the legal system 
creates ‘uniformity and certainty in transactions, discourages opportunistic behaviour, and 
enhances the ability of legal rules to influence primary conduct.’98 
The instability created by retrospective tax legislation undermines the principle of tax 
neutrality in that it serves as a deterrent to foreign businesses making the decision of 
whether or not to invest in a country, and further increases the cost of the decision-making 
process for taxpayers in general. This provides another compelling argument against the 
retrospective introduction of tax legislation becoming the norm in our legal system.    
4.6 Conclusion 
From the analysis above it is clear that is almost impossible to deal with the principles of 
good tax policy in isolation. In almost any debate about a particular tax policy or proposed 
amendment there will be certain principles which are violated by the said policy or 
amendment, and certain principles which support it. However, in the context of discussing 
the retrospective introduction of tax legislation it is clear that when this practice is widely 
relied upon and unregulated, it cannot be considered as good tax policy. It is submitted that 
once a policy that blatantly violates the principles of good tax policy in this manner is 
implemented, there is a real threat that this will result in decreased levels of compliance 
with the tax system. This, in turn, will harm the fiscus. Whilst it is accepted that once tax 
legislation has been passed with retrospective effect a taxpayer cannot rely on the guiding 
principles of good tax policy to challenge such legislation, it is important that policy-
makers are aware of these principles as knowledge thereof will inevitably lead to an 
improved tax system and thereby decrease legal challenges against such system in the 
future.   
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In order to align this practice with the principles of good tax policy it is submitted that the 
approach suggested by Loiacono & Mortimer should be adopted. These authors suggest 
that when retrospective legislation is to be passed, it should be accompanied by a ‘statement 
of compatibility with the public interest.’99 In such statement, the Government should 
explain why, in the circumstances, the passing of retrospective legislation is justified, what 
the threat to the fiscus that is being prevented is, and why the current legislation is 
insufficient to adequately deal with the threat. If this approach is adopted, it will firstly 
prevent an over-reliance on retrospective legislation, and secondly increase the 
transparency and credibility of such legislation.  
It is submitted that the retrospective introduction of tax legislation can therefore meet the 
requirements of good tax policy, provided that: 
i. It is used sparingly and only in situations where the potential harm to the fiscus is 
grievous;  
ii.  It is closely regulated;  
iii. Wherever possible it should be implemented by way of legislation by press release; 
and 
iv. It should be accompanied by a statement of compatibility with the public interest.  
If the above guidelines are followed, the practice of retrospectively introducing tax 
legislation can pass the scrutiny of the principles of good tax policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
99Loiacono & Mortimer (note 1 above) 117. 
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5. PIENAAR BROTHERS (PTY) LTD v COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE AND ANOTHER 2017 (6) SA 435 GP 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Pienaar Brothers was the first time that the practice of legislation by press release was 
challenged in South Africa on constitutional grounds. In this Chapter a brief background 
of the facts will be given, followed by a summary of the arguments relied on by Counsel 
for the Taxpayer and the Commissioner. An analysis of the reasoning of the Court will then 
be undertaken. Finally, the judgment and the reasons therefore will be tested against the 
legal and policy considerations dealt with in the previous chapters. 
5.2 Facts 
The relevant facts relating to the transaction and subsequent distribution that gave rise to 
the dispute can be summarized as follows:  
On 16 March 2007 Serurubele Trading 15 (Pty) Ltd entered into an amalgamation 
transaction as defined in section 44 of the Income Tax Act, in terms of which it acquired 
all of the assets of Pienaar Brothers (Pty) Ltd. In terms of the Sale of Business Agreement 
the effective date of the transaction was deemed to be 1 March 2007 and the purchase 
consideration was to be settled as follows: 
 Serurubeleundertook to issue shares to Pienaar Brothers which were to have a value 
that was the equivalent of the purchase price less the liabilities that were assumed 
(‘equity consideration’);  
 From the equity consideration an amount equal to the value of the shares was deducted; 
and 
 This remaining amount was then credited to the share premium account of Serurubele.  
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On 1 April 2007, after the fulfillment of all of the relevant conditions, the business was 
transferred to Serurubele against payment of the purchase price in the manner set out above. 
On 3 May 2007 the directors of Serurubele made the decision to distribute R29 500 000.00 
to their shareholders pro rata to their shareholding, out of its share premium account (‘the 
distribution’). In accordance with the provisions of section 44 of the Income Tax Act100 as 
it read at the time of the transaction (more fully dealt with below) this distribution should 
have been exempt from Secondary Tax on Companies (‘STC’). However, this was not to 
be the case.  
SARS, relying on the provisions of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 8 of 2007 
(‘TLAA’), issued to the taxpayer an assessment letter in terms of which the taxpayer was 
advised that SARS was levying STC on the distribution amount. It was against this 
assessment that the taxpayer objected.  
5.3 Applicable Legislation: 
Section 44 of the Income Tax Act deals with amalgamation transactions. In terms of section 
44(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, an amalgamation transaction is defined as any transaction- 
‘(a) (i) in terms of which any company (hereinafter referred to as the ‘amalgamated 
company’) which is a resident disposes of all of its assets (other than assets it 
elects to use to settle any debts incurred by it in the ordinary course of its trade 
and other assets required to satisfy any reasonably anticipated liabilities to any 
sphere of government of any country and costs of administration relation to 
the liquidation or winding-up) to another company (hereinafter referred to as 
the ‘resultant company’) which is a resident, by means of an amalgamation, 
conversion or merger; and 
(ii) as a result of which the existence of that amalgamated company will be 
terminated…’ 
In terms of section 44(9) of the Income Tax Act, which was in force at the time of the 
transaction and when the resultant distribution was made, the distribution in question 
                                                          
100 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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should have been exempt from STC. This was due to the fact that section 44(9) ‘exempted 
it from STC by deeming the distribution not to be a dividend for the purposes of STC.’101 
The timeline of the retrospective amendments to section 44 of the Income Tax Act which 
gave rise to the dispute was as follows: 
 20 February 2007: In the budget speech, the Minister of Finance made reference, in 
general terms, to an intention to pass retrospective legislation that would deal with anti-
avoidance arrangements relating to STC. 
 
 21 February 2007: Following the statement made by the Minister of Finance, SARS 
issued the following press release: 
 
‘The STC exemption for amalgamation transactions contained in S44(9) of the Income 
Tax Act, 1962, is withdrawn. This exemption permits a permanent loss of STC, rather 
than a deferral of tax, which is the intent of the amalgamation provisions.’102 
 
 27 February 2007: SARS and the National Treasury release the Draft Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill of 2007 for public comment. At this stage the Bill was aligned with 
the statement made by the Minister of Finance and the subsequent press release, in that 
it proposed the deletions of sections 44(9) and (10) of the Income Tax Act, which 
deletion would be deemed to come into operation on 21 February 2007. 
 
 7 June 2007: After completion of the public comment process, the Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill was published. In the explanatory memorandum that accompanied the 
Bill, it was stated that: 
 
‘As a theoretical matter S. 44 amalgamations should as a deferral mechanism. All assets 
and tax attributes would roll over from the target company to the acquiring company 
with the acquiring company subsequently bearing these tax benefits and burdens. This 
same theory holds for the Secondary Tax on companies (STC). The distribution of 
acquiring company shares in an amalgamation is accordingly free from STC. However, 
                                                          
101Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 25. 
102 SARS Press Statement Explanatory Notes: STC Reforms available at 
https://www.ftomasek.com/archive/p210207a.html, accessed on 13 September 2018.  
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the profits of the target company do not roll over to the acquiring company. The net 
result is often a complete STC exemption when the acquiring company makes a 
distribution of former target company assets. 
It has come to Government’s attention that certain private stakeholders are attempting 
avoidance transactions that are specifically aimed at exploiting this gap. In these 
transactions, a pre-existing target company with substantial assets and profits is 
amalgamated into a newly formed company without assets or profits. The newly formed 
company with substantial assets and profits is amalgamated into a newly formed 
company without assets or profits. The newly formed company then distributes the 
former target company assets, but this distribution is free from the STC due to the lack 
of profits within the newly formed acquiring company. From the above anomaly, the 
proposed amendment inserts Section 44(9A) which deems resultant company equity 
share capital (and share premiums) arising from the amalgamation to be profits not of a 
capital nature available for distribution to shareholders to the extent of any profits 
distributed by the amalgamated company in terms of subsection (9). The result is that 
the amalgamated company’s profits are effectively rolled over to the resultant company, 
so that STC remains payable when the resultant company makes subsequent 
distribution.’103 
 8 August 2007: The TLAA was promulgated. In accordance with the Bill and the 
explanatory memorandum, section 34(1)(c) of the TLAA inserted section 44(9A) into 
the Income Tax Act. In terms of section 34(2) of the TLAA, section 44(9A) was deemed 
to have come into operation on 21 February 2007, and was applicable: 
‘to any reduction or redemption of the share capital or share premium of the resultant 
company, including the acquisition by that company of its shares in terms of Section 85 
of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No 61 of 1973), upon or after that date.’ 
5.4 Issues 
The primary issue which the Court had to decide was whether or not the retrospective 
operation of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act was inconsistent with the provisions of 
the 1996 Constitution. In the event that this section was held to be unconstitutional, the 
                                                          
103 SARS Explanatory Memorandum on the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill 2007 32 available at 
http://www.osall.org.za/docs/2011/02/2007-Taxation-Laws-Amendment-Bill.pdf accessed on 13 September 
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assessment of the distribution to STC would consequently be invalid and have to be set 
aside. 
5.5 Arguments by the Taxpayer 
The two constitutional challenges relied upon by the taxpayer against the retrospective 
operation of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act were as follows: 
(i) That the retrospective operation of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act amounted 
to a contravention of the principle of legality and the Rule of Law; and 
(ii) That the retroactive removal of the exemption from STC without adequate notice 
‘amounted to a deprivation of property that was both procedurally and substantively 
arbitrary, and thus inconsistent with the provisions of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.’104 
5.5.1 The Principle of Legality and the Rule of Law 
The taxpayer argued that in terms of section 1(c) of the 1996 Constitution read together 
with section 2 thereof, the Rule of Law is one of the founding values of the 1996 
Constitution and that any law or conduct which is inconsistent with the 1996 Constitution 
is invalid to the extent of such inconsistency.  The taxpayer further argued that the Rule of 
Law requires that laws should have an essential quality, in this instance being that they 
should be ‘reasonably clear, accessible and prospective in their operation.’105 The taxpayer 
therefore proceeded from the premise that if it could be shown that section 44(9A) of the 
Income Tax Act lacked this essential quality required by law it would be inconsistent with 
the 1996 Constitution and would have to be set aside and declared invalid. 
Whilst the taxpayer did not argue that retrospective laws will always be contrary to the Rule 
of Law, there was only a small concession made in this regard. The one exception identified 
by the taxpayer was that retrospective laws will not be contrary to the Rule of Law ‘when 
there was adequate warning of the intention to implement the change retrospectively.’106 
The basis for this was that in the absence of such warning, a taxpayer cannot be said to 
have knowledge of the law nor the ability to regulate his affairs in accordance therewith. It 
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105Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 40. 
106Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 68. 
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was argued however that this exception did not find application in the present case. The 
primary reason for this was that as set out above, the proposed amendment originally 
announced by the Minister of Finance differed substantially from the eventually 
promulgated legislation. There could not therefore be said to have been ‘adequate warning 
of the intention to implement the change retrospectively’ and as such section 44(9A) of the 
Income Tax Act had to be declared to be inconsistent with the Rule of Law and was 
therefore unconstitutional to the extent of such inconsistency. 
5.5.2 Unjustified Deprivation of Property 
The second constitutional challenge relied on by the taxpayer was that the retroactive 
operation of section 34(2) of the TLAA, and the subsequent tax that it was subjected to as 
a result thereof, amounted to an unjustified deprivation of property under section 25(1) of 
the 1996 Constitution. The basis of this argument was that the application of section 34(2) 
of the TLAA to completed transactions, without adequate notice thereof being given, was 
both procedurally and fundamentally arbitrary and thus unconstitutional. The arbitrariness 
was founded in the fact that without being given prior notice of the intended legislation, 
taxpayers were not afforded a fair opportunity to organize their affairs. Any deprivation of 
property that arose in such circumstances would therefore fall foul of the requirements of 
section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution.   
5.6 Arguments by the Commissioner 
In order to understand the arguments relied on by the Commissioner, it is first necessary to 
look at the context in which the retrospective legislation in question was passed. 
5.6.1 The Introduction of Section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act 
It was contended by the Commissioner that during late 2006 and early 2007 it became 
aware of a loophole in the Income Tax regime which posed a real risk to the National fiscus 
suffering extensive and permanent harm. It was in an effort to prevent this harm from being 
suffered that the Minister of Finance made the statement in terms of which it was 
announced that the exemption in section 44(9) of the Income Tax Act was to be repealed 
with retrospective effect from 21 February 2007.  
5.6.2 Rule of Law 
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In dealing with the taxpayer’s Rule of Law argument, Counsel for the Commissioner did 
not attempt to argue that retrospective legislation will never violate the Rule of Law. 
Rather, it was conceded that whilst retrospective legislation may in certain circumstances 
fall foul of the provisions of the 1996 Constitution, this is a question which must be dealt 
with in the context of: 
 The nature of the legislation in question; 
 The effect of such legislation on the public; and 
 The particular reasons for why a retrospective approach was adopted.  
 
In the present case, it was argued that the defective legislation and the existence of the 
identified loophole in section 44 of the Income Tax Act justified a retrospective approach. 
Tax legislation acts ‘for the benefit of the fiscus and thus the country and the public as a 
whole,’107 and therefore the Commissioner was justified in acting as he did. It was further 
submitted that the taxpayer’s contention that retrospective legislation will only be 
constitutional in instances where adequate prior warning thereof is given was incorrect, on 
the basis that: 
 This is ‘inconsistent with the approach in the foreign jurisdictions to which our Courts 
have frequently look[sic] for guidance in such matters.’108 From the analysis of the 
approach adopted by such foreign jurisdictions it was made clear that retrospective laws 
were both permissible and common place;109 and 
 It is inconsistent with the approach that our own Constitutional Court has laid down in 
regards to the constitutional scrutiny of legislation.110 
 
Counsel for the Commissioner argued that based on the above the question was not whether 
Parliament could legislate retrospectively, but rather ‘the real question is what the standard 
is by which the constitutional validity of retrospective legislation is judged.’111 It was 
                                                          
107Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 64.  
108Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 68.  
109 See Annexure ‘B’ for a brief analysis of the legal position relating to retrospective legislation in the foreign 
jurisdictions relied upon by Fabricius J in his judgment.  
110Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 68. 
111Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 80. 
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further submitted that the correct test to determine whether legislation falls foul of the Rule 
of Law is the rationality test. On the facts, it was contended that based on the rationality 
test, the taxpayer’s argument must fail because: 
 SARS had identified an unintended loophole in the Income Tax Act; 
 The existence of such loophole created the possibility that a ‘flood’ of transactions 
could occur; 
 This posed ‘a real risk that the national fiscus would suffer extensive and permanent 
harm;’112 
 A ‘mere prospective amendment would have encouraged tax payers to exploit the loop-
hole in the last few months before the loop-hole was closed’;113 and 
 It was therefore rational to close the loophole with retrospective effect.114 
 
5.6.3 The amendment differed from the original announcement 
Once Counsel for the Commissioner had established that the rationality test had been 
satisfied, it then dealt with the taxpayer’s argument regarding the fact that due to the 
promulgated legislation differing from what had been announced by the Minister of 
Finance in the Budget speech, no notice thereof had actually been given. In this regard, it 
was contended by Counsel for the Commissioner that: 
 The amendment which was introduced was less drastic than what was originally 
proposed; 
 Notwithstanding the fact that the amendment differed from the announcement, at the 
very least taxpayers were given notice in the Budget Speech that they could no longer 
safely rely on section 44(9) of the Income Tax Act; and 
 There is nothing in either our law or foreign law that requires that ‘the warnings given 
must relate to the exact same amendment that is ultimately made.’115 
 
Accordingly, it was argued that there was no merit in the taxpayer’s argument in this regard. 
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5.6.4 Unjustified Deprivation of Property 
Counsel for the Commissioner contended that the taxpayer’s argument that the 
retrospective operation of the amendment amounted to an unjust deprivation of property 
must fail because: 
i. The amendment did not give rise to a deprivation of property;  
ii. Even if the amendment did give rise to a deprivation of property, such deprivation 
could not be said to be arbitrary; and 
iii. Section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution permits a limitation of rights.116 
5.7 Judgment and the Reasoning of the Court 
After a thorough examination of the arguments relied upon by counsel for the Applicant 
and the Respondents, the Court ultimately ruled that the application be dismissed, with no 
order being made as to costs. Below I will undertake an analysis of the reasoning behind 
this order, especially insofar as the constitutional challenges were concerned. 
5.7.1 The Rule of Law 
It was held by the Court that there is nothing in our law that prohibits the retrospective 
operation of legislation. Furthermore, there is nothing in our law that requires that taxpayers 
be given prior notice thereof. On this point, Fabricius J stated:  
‘There is nothing in our Constitution which prohibits parliament from passing 
retroactive or retrospective legislation. There is nothing in other jurisdictions of similar 
constitutional structure that prohibits such passing. Also, and more significantly, there 
is nothing internal in the Rule of Law which renders retrospective legislation per se 
unconstitutional.’117 
It was noted by the Court that the taxpayer failed to provide any authority from either South 
African or foreign law in support of its contention that ‘knowledge of proposed 
retrospective amendment to the law is fundamental to the rule of law’.118 Notwithstanding 
such omission, the Court found it unnecessary to consider this point further as on the facts 
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of the case, Fabricius J was satisfied that the taxpayer did indeed have sufficient prior notice 
of the proposed amendment and therefore its argument on this point was doomed to fail.  
The Court agreed with the argument made by Counsel for the Commissioner that once it 
had been established that there was no absolute constitutional prohibition to retrospective 
legislation, the remaining question to be dealt with was by what standard the 
constitutionality of such legislation should be tested. In this regard Fabricius J held that the 
rationality test is what must be applied to all legislation.119 In applying the rationality test 
to the facts, it was held that Counsel for the Commissioner had satisfied the Court that it 
had acted in a rational manner by implementing retrospective legislation to close a loop 
hole in the Income Tax Act which posed a real and serious threat to the national fiscus. It 
was further held that the fact that this threat had not actually materialized was irrelevant 
and that it was perfectly appropriate for Parliament to act proactively when such threats are 
identified.120 The end therefore did justify the means and the taxpayer’s argument based on 
the Rule of Law could not succeed in these circumstances.   
The argument by the taxpayer regarding the fact that the promulgated legislation differed 
from what was announced was also regarded as being without merit. In this regard Fabricius 
J stated that: 
‘I am not aware of any provision in any of the jurisdictions that I have referred to, or 
indeed in ours, to the effect that the warnings must relate to the exact same amendment 
that is ultimately made.’121 
It was further held that given the legislative process and the public participation that this 
involves, it would not be possible that the eventual promulgated legislation would mirror 
that which was originally announced. Notwithstanding this, Fabricius J highlighted the fact 
that taxpayers were given a general notice of the impending amendment, and should have 
been aware that they could not rely on the provisions of section 44 of the Income Tax 
Act.122 Accordingly the taxpayer’s argument on this point was also deemed to have been 
unsuccessful.  
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5.7.2 The Unjustified Deprivation of Property 
It was held by Fabricius J that where it is contended that a fundamental right entrenched in 
the Bill of Rights has been infringed, the statutory standard of reasonableness in terms of 
section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution must be applied. In terms of this section a limitation 
of a fundamental right will only be constitutionally valid if it is shown to be both reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society. On this point he further stated that there 
was a third, intermediate criterion that had to be applied, namely: 
‘If the law permits a “deprivation of property” under Section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
the intermediate standard of “sufficient reason” applies.’123 
On the facts it was held that the amendment adopted was not arbitrary and therefore did not 
breach section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution. Furthermore, for reasons dealt with above, 
the amendment met the dual requirements of section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution in that 
they were both reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances. Accordingly, the taxpayer’s 
property challenge also failed. 
5.8 Conclusion 
For the reasons outlined above, it was ultimately held that the taxpayer’s constitutional 
attack on the retrospective operation of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act must fail. It 
is submitted that the significant principles that can be drawn from this case are: 
i. That retrospective tax legislation is not unconstitutional; 
ii. That provided that there is a legitimate legislative purpose, the retrospective 
operation of tax legislation is permissible; and  
iii. That the retrospective operation of tax legislation to completed transactions does 
not result in an unjust deprivation of property as contemplated in Section 25(1) of 
the 1996 Constitution.  
In the next Chapter I will analyse the Pienaar Brothers judgment against the legal and 
policy principles identified in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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6. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PIENAAR BROTHERS JUDGMENT 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Given the fact that the topic of retrospective legislation has always been contentious, it is 
of no surprise that a number of authors have expressed views that differ from those of 
Fabricius J in the Pienaar Brothers judgment.124 In this Chapter I will assess various 
criticisms of the judgment in light of the legal and policy principles dealt with in Chapters 
3 and 4.  
6.2 Legal Challenges 
In this Chapter I will assess the validity of two legal criticisms of the judgment of Fabricius 
J. Firstly, I will determine whether there is any merit in the argument that Fabricius J erred 
in finding as he did that the retrospective application of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax 
Act to the taxpayer’s already completed transaction did not amount to a violation of the 
Rule of Law. Secondly, the argument that the retrospective application of tax legislation to 
completed transactions amounts to an unjustified deprivation of property and thereby 
violates section 25(1) of the 1996 Constitution will be dealt with. Finally, I will determine 
whether the taxpayer erred in so far as they failed to argue that section 44(9A) of the Income 
Tax Act should be set aside on the basis that the manner in which it was implemented 
amounted to a violation of the principle of Separation of Powers.  
6.2.1 The Rule of Law 
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In the editorial of The Taxpayer,125 Advocate TS Emslie strongly condemned the judgment 
of Fabricius J. Firstly, Emslie argued that the application of retrospective legislation to 
already completed transactions amounted to a disregard of taxpayers’ rights under the Rule 
of Law, and that this in itself ‘embodies an absence of tax morality.’126  Whilst it is accepted 
that in certain circumstances there is the possibility that Emslie’s argument could be 
sustained, on the facts ofPienaar Brothers Fabricius J was correct in holding that the 
retrospective application of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act to the taxpayer’s already 
completed transaction did not amount to a violation of the Rule of Law.  
Notably, Fabricius J did not approach the Rule of Law challenge from the perspective of 
whether or not the Rule of Law could be relied upon to strike down legislation with 
retrospective effect. Rather, Fabricius J took the view that whilst in certain circumstances 
retrospective legislation may offend against the Rule of Law, the correct approach is to 
determine the standard against which the constitutional validity of such legislation should 
be tested. As correctly identified by Fabricius J, the test in our law to determine whether or 
not the Rule of Law has been violated is that of rationality. In describing the requirement 
of rationality, the Constitutional Court inLaw Society of South Africa and Another v 
Minister of Transport and Another127 stated as follows: 
‘When making laws, the legislature is constrained to act rationally. It may not act 
capriciously or arbitrarily. It must only act to achieve a legitimate government purpose. 
Thus, there must be a rational nexus between the legislative scheme and the pursuit of 
a legitimate government purpose.’128 
Based on the above, it is submitted that once the Commissioner had satisfied the Court that 
there was a legitimate threat to the fiscus, and that a prospective amendment would have 
been insufficient to adequately deal with such threat, the argument that the retrospective 
operation of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act violated the Rule of Law must fail. In 
such situation the Commissioner had acted rationally in order to achieve the identified 
purpose of protecting the fiscus. Once the rationality test had been satisfied, it was 
unnecessary for Fabricius J to rule on what the consequences of legislation that offends the 
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Rule of Law are. It is therefore submitted that Emilie’s argument that the retrospective 
application of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act to the taxpayer’s already completed 
transaction violated the Rule of Law cannot be sustained. 
 
 
6.2.2 The Unjustified Deprivation of Property 
Emilie’s second criticism of the judgment of Fabricius J is in the approach that was adopted 
towards the question of whether or not tax laws amount to a deprivation of property 
belonging to those being subjected to such laws. In this regard Emslie takes issue with the 
fact that ‘Fabricius J seems to suggest, towards the end of his judgment, that tax laws do 
not give rise to a deprivation of property as contemplated in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.’129 In contrast to this view, Emslie argues that the fact of the matter is that tax 
does indeed compulsorily deprive taxpayers of their money. Based on this, Emslie therefore 
argues that the approach that should have been adopted by Fabricius J in this regard is not 
to ask whether or not taxes amount to a justified deprivation of property, but rather whether 
tax is a justified deprivation of property ‘that warrants the application of retroactive laws 
to completed transactions.’130  Emslie argues that if this approach had been adopted, the 
answer would have been in the negative and the application of section 44(9A) of the Income 
Tax Act to the taxpayer’s already completed transactions would have been found to be 
unconstitutional. 
Whilst there is merit in the criticism by Emslie regarding the manner in which Fabricius J 
approached the taxpayer’s property challenge, it is submitted that even if Fabricius J had 
adopted the approach put forth by Emslie it is unlikely that the taxpayer would have been 
successful with this challenge. As previously stated, the Commissioner satisfied the Court 
that it had identified a threat to the fiscus and that the passing of prospective legislation 
would have been insufficient to counter such threat. Fabricius J correctly identified that the 
retrospective operation of section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act: 
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 Did not solely target the taxpayer, in that it was implemented in terms of a law of 
general application and could not therefore be said to be arbitrary; 
 Served a legitimate purpose, being the closing of an identified loophole in the Income 
Tax Act in order to protect the fiscus from suffering undue harm; and 
 There was a rational connection between the retrospective operation of the amendment 
and the stated purpose, being the closing of the loophole in order to protect the fiscus. 
 
Fabricius J was therefore correct in finding that the retrospective operation of section 
44(9A) of the Income Tax Act to the taxpayer’s already completed transaction did not 
amount to an unjustified deprivation of property as contemplated in section 25(1) of the 
1996 Constitution. It is further submitted that even if Fabricius J had come to the conclusion 
that it did indeed amount to such an unjust deprivation of property, the taxpayer would still 
have failed in this regard as the limitation provisions contained in section 36 of the 1996 
Constitution would have justified such actions.  
It is submitted that based on the particular circumstances of the case Fabricius J was correct 
in his findings on both the Rule of Law and the deprivation of property challenges. It will 
now be determined whether the taxpayer erred in failing to raise the issue that the practice 
of legislation by press release amounts to a violation of the principle of Separation of 
Powers.  
6.2.3 The Separation of Powers 
The answer to the question of whether or not the practice of legislation by press release 
violates the principle of Separation of Powers depends on how one interprets the legal 
impact of the original announcement of the impending amendment. If the law is deemed to 
be changed as of the date of the announcement, then there is a strong argument to be made 
that this practice does indeed amount to a violation of the Separation of Powers. This is 
because notwithstanding the fact that there has been no delegation of legislative power to 
the Executive in respect of the passing of Revenue Bills, the Executive has exercised such 
power. There has further been a shortcutting of the legislative process as prescribed by 
section 77(3) of the 1996 Constitution, section 77(5) of the 1996 Constitution as well as the 
relevant provisions of the Money Bill Act.  
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It is noteworthy that although the taxpayer did not raise this challenge, Fabricius J did 
mention it in passing. In dealing with the taxpayer’s argument that the promulgated 
legislation differed from that which was initially announced, Fabricius J stated: 
‘The fact that this was done in a manner different to that which was initially 
contemplated does not render the process procedurally unfair. Were I to hold otherwise, 
the democratic parliamentary and public process would be seriously undermined. The 
executive does not make laws.’131 
 The above passage of the judgment is noteworthy as it indicates what approach Fabricius 
J has taken to the legal impact of the original announcement. It would appear that Fabricius 
J regards the announcement of the impending legislative change as merely serving as notice 
to taxpayers that retrospective amendments are going to be implemented, and that they can 
no longer safely rely on the identified legislative provisions when structuring their 
transactions. The announcement therefore does not in itself alter the status quo, and the 
actual change in the law will only occur when the amendment is eventually promulgated. 
It is submitted that on the facts ofPienaar Brothers this approach adopted by Fabricius J is 
correct. The reason for this is that taxpayers were not directed to act positively based on 
the contents of the announcement. The position would have been more difficult to sustain 
however had taxpayers been directed to take positive actions, such as in the case of the 
introduction of section 23K of the Income Tax Act, which was dealt with in Chapter 3. In 
such instances one would find it difficult to argue that the announcement has not altered 
the legal position, as the announcement itself placed an obligation on taxpayers to 
undertake actions which were not prescribed by law prior to it being made. In such 
circumstances it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this practice amounts to de facto 
law-making by the Executive.  
It is submitted that whilst the practice of legislation by press release has the potential to 
violate the principle of Separation of Powers, based on the facts ofPienaar Brothers the 
taxpayer would not have been able to successfully argue this point. The announcement of 
the impending amendments to section 44 of the Income Tax Act merely placed the taxpayer 
on notice that it could no longer safely rely on the provisions of this section, and the actual 
                                                          
131Pienaar Brothers (note 5 above) 85. 
61 
 
legal change (although retrospective) only came into existence when section 44(9A) of the 
Income Tax Act was promulgated.  
It is therefore submitted that, in this regard the judgment of Fabricius J was correct in law. 
What must now be determined is whether the judgment adequately addressed the policy 
considerations around the retrospective introduction of tax legislation and the practice of 
legislation by press release. 
6.3 Policy Considerations 
In Chapter 4 I dealt with the policy considerations which should be taken into account when 
the legislature is making the decision of whether or not to introduce retrospective 
amendments to the Income Tax Act and which should guide the practice of legislation by 
press release. In this sub-chapter I will analyse whether the manner in which section 44(9A) 
of the Income Tax Act was implemented met these standards and whether it therefore could 
be said to have amounted to good tax policy. 
6.3.1 Why was Retrospective Legislation Necessary 
As identified in Chapter 4, the retrospective introduction of amendments to the Income Tax 
Act will not undermine the principle of Certainty and thereby amount to bad tax policy in 
situations where taxpayers are employing aggressive tax planning schemes in order to 
exploit loopholes in the Income Tax Act. It is therefore first necessary to identify the 
context in which the retrospective amendment in question was introduced in order to 
determine whether or not such approach was justified.    
In the 2007 Budget Speech the Minister of Finance announced that retrospective legislation 
was going to be passed that would target ‘anti-avoidance arrangements relating to STC.’ In 
the press release that subsequently followed this Budget Speech, the situation was further 
clarified by SARS, which confirmed that the STC exemption provided for in section 44(9) 
of the Income Tax Act was to be withdrawn, on the basis that ‘the exemption permits a 
permanent loss of STC, rather than a deferral of tax, which is the intent of the amalgamation 
provisions.’132 It was therefore clear that a loophole in the Income Tax Act existed, which 
if exploited by taxpayers could potentially cause significant harm to the fiscus. Indeed, it 
was this very loophole that the taxpayer in Pienaar Brothers sought to exploit. Had the 
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taxpayer been successful in this regard, it would have been the beneficiary of an unintended 
R3 687 500.00 (being the STC rate of 12% applied to the distribution out of the share 
premium made by the taxpayer on 3 May 2007) tax exemption. It is in these circumstances 
that it must be determined whether the retrospective introduction of section 44(9A) of the 
Income Tax Act was justified from a policy perspective.   
Emslie further criticized the Pienaar Brothers judgment based on what he identifies as 
being the widely used term loophole by Fabricius J. Emslie argues that the term ‘loophole’ 
suggests that ‘the legislature, SARS or the fiscus… intended certain tax consequences 
which have been avoided, undermined or exploited… by unscrupulous taxpayers.’133  
Based on this, taxpayers are therefore cast as the villains who have no right to complain 
when the Legislature or SARS takes remedial action and applies retrospective legislation 
to completed transactions. In rejecting this approach, Emslie relies on what Schreiner JA 
in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v King134 called ‘the general scope of the Act’. In this 
regard Emslie states that: 
‘When the Act is amended, so as to expand this general scope, it does not mean that a 
so-called “loophole” previously existed, implying that the Act in fact meant something 
other than what is said and that unconscionable taxpayers have exploited the ‘loophole’ 
to subvert what was intended all along.’135 
Emslie argues that if the above approach is adopted, then every time a taxpayer is entering 
into a transaction, and trying to determine what the tax consequences thereof will be, such 
taxpayer must ‘divine what was intended rather than read what was said.’136 Taking this 
further, if such taxpayer relies on what is actually contained in the Act, and consequently 
obtains a tax advantage or benefit, such taxpayer has exploited a loophole and therefore 
acted in an unconscionable manner. In these circumstances, the taxpayer cannot have cause 
to be upset when a retrospective amendment is subsequently applied to his particular 
transaction once it has been completed and as a result thereof he is deprived of his tax 
advantage.  
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Whilst it is agreed that there is merit in Emslie’s argument, it is respectfully submitted that 
it is somewhat naïve in certain respects. Whilst one can accept that in an ideal world there 
would be no loopholes in the law, it is clear that in practice this is not the case. This is 
evident from the vast amounts of research that has been devoted to attempting to explain 
the existence of such anomalies in the law.137 According to the Mismatch Theory,138 the 
primary reason for the existence of loopholes in the legal system is due to the ‘unavoidable 
imperfection of all human creations.’139 The core belief of proponents of the Mismatch 
Theory is that the mismatch between a rule and its underlying purpose arises as a result of 
the limited foresight and hindsight of the rule maker. The limited foresight of rule makers 
renders it impossible for such individuals to ‘anticipate all situations in which the rule might 
have to be applied in the future,’140 whilst the limited hindsight means that‘even where on 
is able to anticipate such situations in theory, it might be hard to determine when one is 
actually encountering them in practice.’141 
InPienaar Brothers, Fabricius J made the accurate statement that ‘economic circumstances 
generally will demand a degree of fluidity. Rigidity does not belong to a modern 
jurisprudence, and even less in tax legislation.’142 It is against the backdrop of this statement 
that the Mismatch Theory finds further validity. This is due to the fact that the rapid change 
in economic circumstances results in rule makers having ‘limited foresight,’ in the sense 
that they cannot predict what the future will hold. As a result of this, their ability to 
implement laws that will achieve their dual purpose of collecting revenue whilst also 
protecting the fiscus is hampered. This will inevitably lead to situations in which there is a 
disparity between a law and its purpose, thereby creating a loophole for enterprising 
taxpayers to exploit. Once it has been established that loopholes in tax legislation are 
inevitable, the question that then arises is what taxpayers should do when they are 
encountered.  
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Advocate Emslie would appear to argue that as taxpayers can only act in accordance with 
the provisions of the Income Tax Act as it is at the time of the planning of a transaction, 
any unintended tax benefit to which they may become entitled is to be welcomed. The fact 
that such benefit was not foreseen by SARS and may even frustrate the true purpose of the 
Act is irrelevant. It is once again submitted that there is a certain naivety to this argument. 
As loopholes arise as a result of a disparity between the law and its intended purpose, 
taxpayers’ strategic usage of them to obtain an unintended tax benefit is to be frowned 
upon. On this point, Weisbach143 states: 
‘There is no social benefit in tax planning… [T]ax planning, all tax planning, not just 
planning associated with traditional notions of shelter, produces nothing of value… No 
new medicines are found, computer chips designed, or homeless housed through tax 
planning.’144 
Whilst it is accepted that in certain circumstances taxpayers may act in good faith in relying 
on the contents of the Income Tax Act and thereby obtain a tax advantage, this is not the 
case where identified loopholes are exploited by aggressive tax planning schemes. In this 
regard Chen states; ‘Seeking out loopholes through a literalist interpretation of the tax law 
is neither a legitimate expectation to be protected nor a desirable behavior to be 
encouraged.’145 
Taxpayers who employ aggressive tax planning schemes which are aimed at exploiting 
loopholes in the Income Tax Act are acting to the detriment of the fiscus, and the nation as 
a whole. The loss of revenue that arises as a result of these schemes is significant, and 
taxpayers who employ such tactics should not be encouraged. In light of this, Emilie’s 
portrayal of taxpayers who are caught out when engaging in these schemes as being 
deserving of our sympathy cannot be supported.  
It is clear from the facts of Pienaar Brothers that the conduct of the taxpayer amounted to 
an attempt to exploit a loophole in an effort to receive an unintended tax benefit. Whilst 
there was a valid commercial basis for the transaction entered into by the taxpayer, being 
the introduction of a BEE partner into the business, it was clear that the transaction itself 
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was structured in such a manner so as to avoid the liability to pay the substantial amount of 
STC that would otherwise have arisen. The prevailing circumstances did therefore justify 
a retrospective approach to the passing of the amendment. What must now be determined 
is whether the manner in which such retrospective legislation was passed amounted to good 
tax policy. 
6.3.2 The Announced Change 
As discussed in Chapter 4, whilst the practice of legislation by press release adequately 
resolves the traditional concerns associated with retrospective legislation, it may give rise 
to additional concerns when it is not implemented in accordance with certain standards. 
One of these situations is where the initial announcement is so vague as to render it 
impossible for taxpayers to determine what transactions are being targeted. In such 
situations the practice will create additional uncertainty for taxpayers and thereby amount 
to bad tax policy. It is therefore necessary to determine whether the announcement made 
inPienaar Brothers was sufficiently clear so as to provide guidance to taxpayers as to what 
transactions were being targeted. 
The original announcement by the Minister of Finance on 20 February 2007 was vague, in 
that it only made reference to an intention that retrospective legislation was to be passed 
that would target ‘anti-avoidance arrangements relating to STC.’ If this was the only 
mention of the proposed amendment prior to its eventual promulgation, it is submitted that 
it would be difficult to argue that the process amounted to good tax policy. This however 
was not the case. The position was clarified by SARS in its press release dated 21 February 
2007, and further in the draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill that followed. From these 
documents it was clear that SARS intended to remove the STC exemption for 
amalgamation transactions, thereby ensuring that STC became payable at the time that 
equity shares in the resultant company (in this instance being the taxpayer) were distributed 
by the amalgamated company to its shareholders. I would therefore argue that the 
announcements regarding the proposed retrospective legislation were sufficiently clear and 
did not in themselves give rise to any additional issues relating to the certainty of the law. 
Closely related to the issue regarding the clarity of the initial announcement is the fact that 
in order to amount to good tax policy the promulgated legislation should not differ from 
what was originally announced. One of the arguments relied on by the taxpayer in Pienaar 
Brotherswas that the initial announcement proposed the deletion of subsections 44(9) and 
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(10) from the Income Tax Act, whilst when the legislation was eventually promulgated it 
was done so in the form of the insertion of section 44(9A) into the Income Tax Act. Due to 
this difference, it was contended by the taxpayer that it did not receive warning of the 
proposed amendment and it therefore violated the Rule of Law (which is closely related to 
the policy principle of Certainty). It is submitted that in the circumstances of the case the 
amendment that was eventually promulgated was less drastic than what was originally 
announced. It is further submitted that the tax liability arising from the taxpayer’s 
transaction would have remained the same had the promulgated legislation conformed 
exactly with what was originally announced. As stated by Fabricius J on this point, ‘all 
taxpayers were thus given ample notice that, to put it at its lowest, they could not safely 
rely on section 44(9A) of the Income Tax Act after 21 February 2007.’146 In these 
circumstances, the fact that the promulgated legislation differed from what was originally 
announced does not render the process an example of bad tax policy.          
6.3.3 Dissemination of the Announcement 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there are two requirements that must be met in order for the 
announcement of the impending retrospective amendment to be said to have been 
adequately disseminated, these being: 
i. That the actual notice itself must be adequately broadcasted to the general public; 
and 
ii. That following the actual notice there must be an ‘immediate and widespread 
dissemination of actions relating to proposed changes’.  
In light of the above it is now necessary to evaluate the manner in which the notice of the 
proposed retrospective amendment was broadcast in Pienaar Brothers.  
In South Africa the Budget Speech is firstly disseminated to the general public when the 
speech itself is televised. After the initial televised announcement, the Budget Speech is 
then reprinted and discussed widely in the media and by professionals acting in the field of 
tax. It is therefore submitted that this process is very transparent, and that any interested 
parties would find it difficult to argue that they were not given adequate notice of the 
contents thereof. Whilst the actual process by which legislation by press release was not 
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dealt with directly by Fabricius J in his judgment, he did agree with the statement made by 
Counsel for the Commissioner that; ‘The question of whether the Applicant and its advisors 
actually made themselves aware of the budget speech or Draft Bill is in the present context 
not relevant.’147 I would submit that whilst in the present context there was adequate 
dissemination of the actual notice of the impending retrospective amendment, and that 
given the nature of the taxpayer and the complex restructuring transaction that it was 
undertaking it should have been aware of such impending amendment, this statement will 
not always hold true. Given the fact the fundamental argument in favor of legislation by 
press release is that it gives taxpayers advance notice of impending retrospective 
amendments, the fact of whether or not taxpayers were actually made aware of the notice 
cannot be said to be irrelevant. Where smaller taxpayers that cannot afford the services of 
a team of tax advisers are concerned, care must be taken to ensure that all possible measures 
are taken to make them aware of the announcement. As the actual notice itself was 
adequately disseminated to the taxpayer, or at the very least their tax advisers, it must now 
be determined whether any constructive steps were taken towards implementing the 
proposed amendment. 
On 27 February 2007, a mere 7 days after the initial announcement of the intention to deal 
with ‘anti-avoidance arrangements relating to STC,’ SARS and the National Treasury 
released the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2007 for public comment. There can 
be no argument that this constitutes a constructive step towards the implementation of the 
proposed amendment, as it signals the beginning of the legislative process for the passing 
of a revenue Bill. Whilst the amendment proposed in the Draft TLAA differed from the 
amendment that was eventually promulgated, it was clear at this stage that positive steps 
were being taken towards the closing of the identified loophole in section 44 of the Income 
Tax Act. The next positive step taken by SARS and the National Treasury was to facilitate 
the public comment process, and to act on the numerous comments receive. It is as a result 
of this process that the TLAA was then published on 7 June 2007. Based on this process, 
and the fact that it was clearly always the intention of SARS and National Treasury to close 
the loophole in section 44 of the Income Tax Act, it is difficult to comprehend the argument 
made by the taxpayer that it was only when the TLAA was published that it received the 
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‘first indication of any amendment that would impact upon the STC position of an entity in 
the position of the Applicant.’148 
 
6.4 Statement of Compatibility With The Public Interest 
As identified by Loiacono& Mortimer, it would be beneficial that when the decision is 
made to implement retrospective tax legislation, this should be accompanied by what they 
term a ‘statement of compatibility with the public interest.’149 In Pienaar Brothers, it is 
clear from the original announcement, as well as the various press releases and explanatory 
memoranda that SARS and National Treasury did indeed explain what the threat to the 
fiscus was, and why merely prospective legislation was unable to adequately deal with such 
threat. What was not addressed however was whether there were alternative measures that 
could have been relied on to deal with the taxpayer’s transaction in question. 
One of the criticisms of the judgment handed down by Fabricius J is that the Court failed 
to acknowledge that based on the facts, the  Commissioner was not entirely without remedy 
if he wanted to prevent the negative impact of taxpayers ‘engaging in tax avoidance 
transactions by using section 44(9) of the Income Tax Act.’150 Once the Commissioner had 
identified that taxpayers were abusing a loophole in the Income Tax Act in order to enter 
into tax avoidance schemes, the Commissioner could have challenged such transactions by 
relying on the general anti avoidance provisions (GAAR) contained in sections 80A-L of 
the Income Tax Act. Whilst a debate on whether the transaction in question could have 
been successfully challenged by relying on GAAR is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
it is still of significance to note that there was this potential alternative option available to 
the Commissioner.  
It is submitted that the fact that the Commissioner had more than one option with which to 
challenge the transaction in question does not impact upon the validity of the judgment 
from a legal perspective. Fabricius J was correct in holding that the correct standard against 
which to test the legislation in question was that of rationality. It is further submitted that 
the standard of rationality sets a low bar, because as soon as it can be shown that the law 
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served the purpose for which it was implemented, the fact that a better manner to achieve 
the desired result existed is irrelevant.151 In such situations the law in question is rationally 
related to the purpose for which it was implemented (in this instance being ‘revenue 
collection’) and it is difficult to imagine a Court questioning the decision made by the 
Legislature or interfering in the legislative process by striking down such law.    
From a policy perspective however, the fact that the judgment was silent on the alternative 
measures with which to challenge the transaction is of significance. As dealt with in 
Chapter 4, whenever Government wants to rely on retrospective legislation there should be 
an onus on it to prove why the current legislation is inadequate to deal with the identified 
threat. A failure to adequately deal with potential alternative measures is a sign that the use 
of retrospective legislation is open to abuse by Government, due to it not being 
implemented in a transparent manner. It is therefore unfortunate that Fabricius J did not 
deal with this point, as from a policy perspective it is clear that the manner in which 
legislation by press release is utilized in South Africa can be improved.  
6.5 Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis it is submitted that the judgment of Fabricius J in Pienaar 
Brothers was a well-balanced one in the circumstances. Importantly, what one can take 
away from the judgment is that whilst there is nothing in law that will automatically render 
retrospective legislation unconstitutional, this must be a decision that is made on the facts 
of the particular case in question.  
Although it is accepted that Fabricius J was correct in his conclusion that there is ‘no 
authority for the proposition that retrospective tax legislation would survive constitutional 
scrutiny only if there were “good reasons” for it,’152 and further that ‘It is not for a court to 
say what a good “reason” is,’153 the only criticism which I have of the judgment is that 
Fabricius J was silent on the policy considerations that are relevant when discussing tax 
policy design and the decision of whether or not to introduce retrospective amendments to 
the Income Tax Act. There is a fear that the judgment in Pienaar Brothers will lead to an 
increase in the usage of retrospective tax, and it would have been beneficial if Fabricius J 
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had discussed the circumstances of when such legislation will be justified from a policy 
perspective, and how such legislation should best be implemented. 
In the next Chapter a brief overview of the findings of the preceding chapters will be 
provided. In addition, recommendations which should guide the practice of introducing 
retrospective tax legislation and the practice of legislation by press release will be put forth.   
7. CONCLUSION 
This study set out to challenge and to answer the question of what considerations should 
guide the Legislature when making the decision of whether or not to retrospectively 
introduce tax legislation in South Africa? In this chapter I will summarise my conclusions 
as to my findings in this regard.  
Firstly, although there is no express prohibition against retrospective tax legislation in the 
1996 Constitution, the question of whether or not such legislation is inconsistent with the 
provisions thereof is one which falls to be determined on the facts of the particular case in 
question. It is submitted that there are two situations in which there is a strong possibility 
that retrospective tax legislation will fall short of the high standards set by the 1996 
Constitution, namely: 
i. Where such legislation is not rationally connected to a legitimate Government 
purpose;154 and 
ii. Where the practice of legislation by press release has been relied upon to circumvent 
the legislative process and where taxpayers are expected to take positive actions 
based on the contents of the announcement.  
It is therefore recommended that if Government is intending on introducing retrospective 
tax legislation, it must be ensured that such legislation is rationally connected to the purpose 
that it is aiming to achieve. Furthermore, where there is reliance on legislation by press 
release, it should merely serve to warn taxpayers that they can no longer safely rely on a 
particular provision of the Income Tax Act, as opposed to directing taxpayers to take 
positive actions based on an announcement that is not yet law.  
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Secondly, it is possible for the retrospective introduction of tax legislation to meet the 
requirements of good tax policy design. In order to ensure that this is achieved, the starting 
point should be for Government to communicate with the general public so as to ensure 
awareness of:  
i. The fact that the use of aggressive tax planning schemes aimed at exploiting 
loopholes in the Income Tax Act in order to obtain unintended tax benefits amounts 
to theft; and 
ii. Furthermore, that in such instances they are the ultimate victims of such theft.155 
Once the general public is made aware of these facts, and further awareness that 
retrospective tax legislation is a powerful tool in the hands of Government to combat such 
thefthas been created, what should follow is a more positive attitude towards this practice. 
To further strengthen this practice, Government should further ensure that: 
i. Retrospective tax legislation is sparsely used; and 
ii. That when it is used, it is accompanied by a ‘statement of compatibility with the 
public interest’156 which advises the general public as to why retrospective 
legislation is necessary, what the threat which it is aiming to counter is and finally 
why the existing legislation is insufficient to deal with this threat.  
Thirdly, where the practice of legislation by press release is utilised and meets the 
requirements of the ‘best policy guide for the practice of legislation by press release’ such 
practice does resolve both the legal and policy concerns commonly associated with the 
retrospective introduction of tax legislation. In order to meet this policy guide, Government 
must ensure that: 
i. The original notice of the impending retrospective legislation is sufficiently clear;  
ii. That there is a period of time established at the outset in terms of which the proposed 
legislation is to be promulgated;157 and 
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iii. Not only must there be widespread dissemination of the announcement to the 
general public, but the Government must also be seen to be taking constructive steps 
towards the implementation of the legislation in question.158 
Fourthly, whilst the judgment handed down by Fabricius J in Pienaar Brothers was correct 
in law, it can be criticised on the basis that the learned judge did not discuss the policy 
considerations underpinning the retrospective introduction of tax legislation and the 
practice of legislation by press release. Had these considerations been discussed, it is 
possible that the fear of the judgment resulting in a flood of retrospective legislation may 
not have arisen.  
Finally, it is submitted that Palmer &Sampford were correct in stating that ‘the fact that the 
proposed statute is ‘retrospective’ should merely be the starting-point of that debate, not its 
conclusion.’159Once this approach is adopted, and all of the surrounding circumstances are 
taken into account by the Legislature when making the decision of whether or not to 
introduce retrospective tax legislation, it may well be that the outcome of the debate is that 
the legislation in question is not tyrannical, and that the end does indeed justify the means. 
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          Annexure ‘A’ 
Criteria for an Efficient Tax System160 
Author Criteria Title 
Adam Smith  
1776161 
- Equality  
- Certainty 
- Convenience of Payment 
- Economy in Collection 
Canons of Taxation 
Meade Report – United 
Kingdom 1978162 
- Incentives and Economic 
Efficiency 
- Distributional Effects 
- International Aspects 
- Simplicity 
- Costs of Administration and 
Compliance 
- Flexibility and Stability 
- Transitional Problems 
Characteristics of a Good 
Tax Policy 
OECD  
(Ottawa) 1998163 
- Neutrality 
- Efficiency 
- Certainty and Simplicity 
- Effectiveness and Fairness 
- Flexibility 
Taxation Framework 
Conditions (for electronic 
commerce)  
American Institute of 
Certified Public 
Accountants 
- Equity and Fairness 
- Certainty  
- Convenience of Payment 
- Economy in Collection 
Guiding Principles of 
Good Tax Policy  
                                                          
160 Adapted from C Alley & D Bentley ‘A Remodelling of Adam Smith’s Tax Design Principles’ (2005) 20 
Australian Tax Forum 586.  
161Smith (note 53 above).  
162 Meade Report ‘The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation’ (1978) available at 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00014788.1978.9729134?journalCode=rabr20 (accessed 13 
September 2018). 
163 Committee on Fiscal Affairs ‘Electronic Commerce: Taxation Framework Conditions’ (1998) available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/3/1923256.pdf (accessed 12 September 2018). 
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2001164 - Simplicity 
- Neutrality 
- Economic Growth and 
Efficiency 
- Transparency and Visibility 
- Minimum Tax Gap 
- Appropriate Government 
Revenues  
The Mirrlees Review 
2011165 
- Minimise the Negative 
Effects of the Tax System 
on Welfare and Economic 
Efficiency 
- Minimal Administrative 
and Compliance Costs 
- Fairness (other than in the 
distributional sense) 
- Transparency 
Tax by Design 
The Davis Committee 
2015166 
- Efficiency (Economic and 
Administrative) 
- Equity 
- Fairness 
- Transparency and Certainty 
- Flexibility and Buoyancy 
An Analytical Framework 
for the Davis Tax 
Committee 
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Annexure ‘B’ 
Legal Position in Respect of Retrospective Taxation in Foreign Jurisdictions 
Below is a brief outline of the foreign jurisdictions which the Court in the Pienaar Brothers 
case looked to for guidance on the issue of retrospective tax legislation. 
1. Canada: 
The only prohibition against retroactive law-making is contained in Section 11(g) of the 
Canadian Constitution, which deals with criminal law.167 Professor Hogg identifies that 
retroactive statutes are commonly used in two situations, namely: 
i. Tax legislation is often made retrospective to budget night, when the law was 
publicly announced; and 
 
ii. Retroactive legislation is used to change laws that have been interpreted in an 
unexpected manner.168 
 
2. United States: 
At a federal level, the only prohibition to retrospective taxation legislation is where such 
legislation cannot meet the threshold requirement of rationality.169 In dealing with the 
rationality test, the court in United States v Carlton170 stated that: 
‘... provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate 
purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation 
remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches... 
 
To be sure, ... retroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by legislation 
that only has future effects... the retroactive aspects of legislation, as well as the 
prospective aspects, must meet the test of due process, and the justifications for the latter 
may not suffer for the former... that the burden is met simply by showing that the 
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retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative 
purpose’.171 
 
3. The European Union: 
In the European Union there is no bar to retrospective taxation legislation.172 In the case of 
Hail v Rutgen173 the court stated: 
‘... there is no general principle under the (European Convention on Human Rights) that 
changes in Civil Law should not operate retrospectively’.174 
 
4. England: 
In English law there is no bar to retrospective taxation legislation.175 In the case of James 
v IRC the court stated as follows with regards to retrospective legislation: 
‘As the Constitutional Law of England stands today Parliament has the power to enact 
by statute any fiscal law, whether of a prospective or retrospective nature and whether 
or not it may be thought by some persons to cause injustice to individual citizens’.  
 
5. Germany: 
In Germany the general position is that there is a ban on retrospective legislation, although 
this ban is subject to certain exceptions. Two of the identified exceptions in which 
retrospective legislation will be permissible are: 
i. When a reasonable taxpayer cannot claim trust or confidence in the prevailing 
legal situation; and 
 
ii. When the confidence of a taxpayer in the prevailing legal system has to be 
subordinated to the interest of the legislator.176 
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